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Abstract: Countries are increasingly using tax policy as an instrument to navigate through the recent global financial difficulties, and China is no exception.
In an effort to avoid the loss of tax revenue resulting from the utilization of foreign holding companies, the Chinese tax authority issued Circular 698 granting
itself the authority to tax transactions between foreign entities taking place outside of China if the transactions effectively transfer interest in a domestic enterprise. The phrase “denying the existence of an offshore holding company which
is used for tax planning purposes” in Circular 698 appears to share similarities
with the veil-piercing doctrine, a long established doctrine of corporate law existing independent of tax regulations, which disregards the separate legal personality of a company. This article addresses the legitimacy and policy objectives behind Circular 698 and its implementation, and the article compares the
Chinese policy to the application of a similar policy in India. The article then
examines how the expansive and extraterritorial veil-piercing scenario created
by Circular 698 compares with traditional veil-piercing justifications and the
three veil-piercing scenarios listed in China’s Company Law. The article interprets Circular 698 in a global context, which underscores the legitimacy of Circular 698 and suggests how foreign experiences can improve the enforcement
mechanism for Circular 698. By drawing a global picture this article also enhances the proposition that there is a need to have a uniform approach to dealing with the loopholes that Circular 698 tries to fill at the global level.
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INTRODUCTION
In an effort to avoid the loss of tax revenue resulting from the utilization of foreign holding companies, the General Administration of Taxation,
China’s tax authority, issued the Circular on Strengthening the Management of Enterprise Income Tax Collection of Proceeds from Equity Transfers by Non-Resident Enterprises (Circular 698) on December 10, 2009,
granting itself the authority to tax transactions between foreign entities taking place outside of China if the transaction effectively transfers interest in
a domestic enterprise. The phrase “denying the existence of an offshore
holding company which is used for tax planning purposes” in Circular 698
appears to share similarities with the veil-piercing doctrine, a long established doctrine of corporate law existing independent of tax regulations,
which disregards the separate legal personality of a company and limited
liability of shareholders.
This article addresses the legitimacy and policy objectives behind Circular 698 as well as its implementation. It questions the General Administration of Taxation’s authority to issue Circular 698 and its alignment with
the policy objectives underlying veil piercing. With the recent creation of
Circular 698, the cases utilizing the Circular are limited, but the article examines several Chinese cases and looks to the Vodafone case in India for a
comparative study of India’s application of a similar policy based on the
common law veil-piercing doctrine.
Compared to the three veil-piercing scenarios listed in the Chinese
Company Law, Circular 698 tries to pierce the corporate veil in a more expansive and extraterritorial manner. This raises many questions including:
Does the scenario specified in Circular 698 justify veil piercing? If so, does
the General Administration of Taxation have the authority to establish the
new rules? What investment techniques inspired the creation of Circular
698? This article attempts to look into these questions. The rest of the article proceeds as follows.
Part 1 offers a brief introduction of key rules created by Circular 698
and tries to understand Circular 698 by looking into its connection with the
conventional veil-piercing doctrine. To this end, the section includes a brief
introduction to the common law veil-piercing doctrine. The analysis of the
legitimacy of Circular 698 appears in Part 2, after which Part 3 looks at the
Chinese adoption of the veil-piercing doctrine and examines specific instances of Circular 698’s application resulting in piercing of the corporate
veil. Then Part 4 looks into possible ways of improving Circular 698 by
reference to the Ramsay principle and related doctrines developed in other
jurisdictions. Part 5 examines the rationality of Circular 698’s attempt at
expanding the veil-piercing doctrine from a global perspective. First, the
section examines the Chinese foreign investment structures and incentives
that lead to a loss of Chinese tax revenue. Second, the section addresses the
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global emphasis on increased tax revenue and anti-avoidance. A conclusion
follows in the end, framing the discussion in terms of the rule of law and
changes resulting from the need for fair tax policies involving international
investments.
I. CIRCULAR 698 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VEILPIERCING DOCTRINE
A. Circular 698: Scope and Application
The PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law provides that:
Non-resident enterprises that have set up institutions or premises in
China shall pay enterprise income tax in relation to the income originating from China obtained by their institutions or establishments,
and the income incurred outside China if there is an actual relationship with the institutions or establishments set up by such enterprises.
Where non-resident enterprises that have not set up institutions or
establishments in China, or where institutions or establishments are
set up but there is no actual relationship with the income obtained by
the institutions or establishments set up by such enterprises, they
shall pay enterprise income tax in relation to the income originating
from China.1

On their face, these provisions indicate that the non-resident enterprises with or without establishment in China shall pay enterprise income tax
for their income generated inside China. Article 7 of the Implementing
Rules of the Enterprise Income Tax Law prescribes the principle of taxing
the income generated from inside China.2 In terms of equity, according to
1
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (中华人民共和国企业所得税法) [Enterprise
Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) at art. 3(2) & 3(3), http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?id=5910&lib=law# [hereinafter PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law] (China).
2
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国企业所得税法
实施条例) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by Order of State Council No. 512, Nov. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Sept
13, 2013), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6546 (China). Article 7 of the Regulation provides that:

(3) With regard to income from the transfer of property, the income from the transfer of
real property shall be determined according to the place where such real property is situated,
while the income from the transfer of personal property shall be determined according to the
place where the enterprise or institution of that transfers the property is located;
(4) the income from the transfer of equity investment assets shall be determined according
to the place where the invested enterprise is located.
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Item 4 of this article, if the equity transferred is in a Chinese company, then
the income generated out of the transfer is regarded as the income generated
from inside China, and the transferor shall pay enterprise income tax in
China.3 To illustrate this rule, assume a transaction in which a US Company
A transfers its owned equity of Company B in the British Virgin Islands to
a German company D. If Company B is the holding company of Company
A that holds equity in Company C in China, Company A can transfer the
equity of the Chinese Company C by transferring the equity of Company B
to Company D. This equity deal has nothing to do with China. Accordingly,
A does not need to pay Chinese tax.

Figure 1: Hypothetical Scenario Caught in Circular 698
In the above case, consider whether the income obtained by the nonresident enterprise (Company A) from transferring equity in a Chinese resident enterprise (Company C) indirectly through the transfer of equity in an
offshore holding company (Company B) should be regarded as the income
originating from China and, if so, does it trigger an enterprise income tax in
China? According to Circular 698, Company A needs to pay Chinese tax
for its transfer of equity in the holding company to Company D, even
though the transaction is a pure offshore transaction. Circular 698 effectively subjects the transfer of equity between two non-resident enterprises to
Chinese tax law.
In Circular 698, the non-resident enterprise which indirectly transfers
the Chinese resident enterprise is termed the “foreign investor” (actual con-

3
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trolling party), and the holding company put in place between the foreign
investor and the resident enterprise is labeled the “offshore holding company.”4 For the purpose of discussion, the cases in Circular 698 referred to
later follow the above hypothetical example. In the above hypothetical case,
Company A is the foreign investor (actual controlling party), Company B is
the offshore holding company and Company C is the Chinese resident enterprise.
Article 5 of Circular 698 further provides that: when the actual tax liability in the country (region) where the overseas holding company being
transferred is located is less than 12.5%, or the aforementioned country (region) does not tax foreign-sourced income,5 the foreign investor’s indirect
transfer of the Chinese resident enterprise’s equity shall be examined by the
Chinese tax authority. It also provides the materials the foreign investor
needs to submit to the Chinese tax authority.6
4
Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Jiaqiang Fei Jumin Qiye Guquan Zhuanrang Suode Zhengshou
Qiye Suodeshui Guanli de Tongzhi Guoshui Han [2009] 698 Hao (国家税务总局关于加强非居民企业
股权转让所得企业所得税管理的通知, 国税函[2009] 69 号)[Notice of the State Administration of
Taxation on Strengthening the Management of Enterprise Income Tax Collection of Proceeds from Equity Transfers by Non-resident Enterprises (Circular No. 698)], (promulgated by the State Administration of Taxation, Dec. 10, 2009) at art. 5 & 6 [hereinafter Circular 698] (China).
5
The term “does not tax foreign-sourced income” may be interpreted to apply if the offshore intermediary jurisdiction does not tax foreign-sourced income. On March 28, 2011, China’s State Administration of Taxation issued the Announcement Regarding Several Issues on the Administration of Nonresident Enterprise Income Tax (Announcement No. 24) to clarify certain terms in Circular 698. Announcement No. 24 now clarifies that this term would apply only if foreign-sourced gains on the share
transfer transaction are not taxed in the intermediary holding jurisdiction. It does not cover scenarios
whereby the offshore intermediary jurisdiction does not impose tax on other types of foreign-sourced
income such as dividends and interest. Although Announcement No. 24 is a great attempt to clarify the
term, ambiguity still exists. For example, in some jurisdictions the capital gains are not taxed by virtue
of reasons such as concessions or participation exemption. It is not clear whether these jurisdictions are
caught by Circular 698. The purpose of Announcement No. 24 (see infra note 69) is to introduce some
clarity to the application and interpretation of Circular 698, thereby streamlining administrative procedures and reducing the administrative burden of non-resident enterprises.
6
Circular 698, Article 5 reads:
In case the actual tax burden of the country (region) where one equity-transferred overseas holding
company is domiciled is lower than 12.5% or no tax is levied on the income of its overseas residents
while an overseas investor (actual controller) indirectly transfers the equity of a Chinese resident enterprise, it should within 30 days upon the signing of the equity transfer contract provide to the competent
taxation administration where an equity-transferred Chinese resident enterprise is domiciled the following documents:

(1) Equity transfer contract or agreement;
(2) Relations of an overseas investor and its transferred overseas holding company in capital, business and purchase and sale;
(3) Statuses of production and operation, personnel, finance and properties of the overseas
holding company with equity transferred by an overseas investor;
(4) Ties of the overseas holding company with equity transferred by an overseas investor
and a Chinese resident enterprise in capital, business and purchase and sale;
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Under Circular 698, the tax authority has the power to deny the corporate veil of the offshore holding company used for tax-planning purposes if,
after reviewing the above required materials, the tax authority finds that
Company A’s indirect transfer of equity in Company C constitutes an abuse
of the corporate form, and certain tax liabilities are thus avoided without a
reasonable business purpose.7 In other words, the Chinese tax authority will
ignore Company B’s corporate form and regard the transaction as Company
A’s direct transfer of equity in Company C to Company D, and the proceeds generated from the transfer are deemed to be “the income originating
from China,” thereby achieving the purpose of levying the Chinese enterprise income tax on Company A.
B. Circular 698 and the Veil-Piercing Doctrine
The principles that the corporation has an independent personality as a
legal entity and that the corporation’s stockholders only assume limited liability are the cornerstones of modern corporation law. However, each principle has exceptions. In very special circumstances, such as the fraudulent
act of taking advantage of the corporation’s independent legal personality,
the common law8 doctrine of piercing the corporate veil allows the court to
achieve fairness by denying the legal entity’s independent personality or

(5) Explanations for reasonable commercial purpose of the establishment of an equitytransferred overseas holding company by an overseas investor; and
(6) Other related documents required by the taxation administration.
The term “actual tax burden” (or “effective tax burden”) is further clarified by Announcement No. 24,
which explains that the terminology refers to the effective tax burden imposed on the gains on the share
transfer transaction per se. It seems that as long as the gain is taxed at a rate of not lower than 12.5% in
the intermediary holding jurisdiction, the transferor would not be required to report under Circular 698.
Article 2 of Announcement No. 24 also states that the transfer of listed shares in Chinese resident enterprises bought and sold over a public securities market are not subject to Circular 698. This seems to
suggest that the cases whereby a non-resident enterprise purchases and sells such listed shares in Chinese resident enterprises via over-the-counter trade sales and private placements are covered by Circular
698.
7
Circular 698, Article 6 provides that:
In case an overseas investor (actual controller) makes indirect transfer of the equity of a Chinese resident enterprise in the forms including abusing organization without reasonable
commercial purpose to dodge the obligation of paying enterprise income tax, the competent
taxation administration may reconfirm the quality of the equity transfer trading in accordance
with the economic substance after reporting to the State Administration of Taxation for the
examination and approval to negate the existence of the overseas holding company serving as
taxpayer.
8
Here, common law refers to judge made law in countries using the British legal system. As discussed later in the article, the veil-piercing doctrine originated from the courts.
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depriving the corporation stockholders of limited liability protection.9
It was not until 2005 that China began formally introducing the concept of piercing the corporate veil into the Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China (2005). At present, the application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is limited to the following scenarios:
a) where a shareholder abuses his privileges of incorporation as a
shareholder and causes loss to the company or other shareholders, he may be liable in damages;10
b) where any of the shareholders of a company evades debts by
abusing the company’s independent status as a legal person or
shareholders’ limited liability, thus seriously damaging the interests of any creditor of the company, the shareholder shall be
held jointly liable for the debts of the company;11
c) in a one-shareholder limited liability company, if the assets of
the company and the single shareholder are integrated and indivisible, then he and the company will be jointly liable for the
debts of the company;12 or
d) where a controlling shareholder, de facto controller, director,
supervisor or senior officer uses his relationship to damage the
interests of the company causing it loss, he may be liable in
damages to the company.13
However, Chinese courts have not developed clear judicial guidance in
applying these principles in real cases. Compared to their counterparts in
common law jurisdictions, judicial opinions in this regard are far less
clear.14
The General Administration of Taxation stepped in at the end of 2009
by issuing Circular 698, which appeared to create a new regime in which
the corporate veil can be pierced outside the conventional veil-piercing
framework under the Company Law. The relevant rule under Circular 698
is that where a foreign investor transfers the equity in a Chinese resident en-

See James K. Dumont, Pleading Insanity in Piercing the Corporate Veil: Supplemental Rule E’s
Heightened Pleading Standard Protects Polluting Shipowners in the Fourth Circuit, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J.
655, 670 (2014).
10
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (2005 Xiuding) (中华人民共和国公司修订 2005)
[Company Law (2005 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 27,
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) CHINALAW INFO (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) at art. 20(2),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law [hereinafter PRC Company Law] (China)
11
Id. at art. 20(1).
12
Id. at art. 64.
13
Id. at art. 21.
14
For a study of veil piercing cases in China see Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China:
Where Is It Now and Where Is It Heading? 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2012).
9
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terprise indirectly so as to avoid paying the enterprise income tax on its income generated from China through setting up an offshore holding company, the Chinese tax authority can ignore the existence of the offshore holding company and deem it as a direct transfer of the equity in the Chinese
resident enterprise by the foreign investor. As a result, a capital gain tax (in
the form of the enterprise income tax under Chinese tax law) would be levied on such a transaction.
The veil-piercing doctrine originated in the leading case of Salomon v.
Salomon & Co. Ltd decided by the House of Lords in England in 1897.15
The case laid down the cornerstone of modern company law due to its role
in the establishment of the two most important principles: (i) the shareholders only assume limited liability for the company to the extent of the contributed capital; and (ii) the company is an independent legal person from
its shareholders. However, the courts also foreshadowed exceptions to these
two principles—the principle of lifting the veil of the corporation: whether
Salomon Co. had been fraudulently used to avoid Salomon’s liability,
which implied that the shareholder’s fraud may constitute an exceptional
ground not to apply the two principles above.16 Later, in order to prevent the
shareholders of the company from abusing the principle of independent legal personality, the court gradually drew the boundaries of various exceptional circumstances in which the principles of shareholders’ limited liability and the corporation’s independent legal personality are not applicable.
The case law jurisprudence formed the so-called veil-piercing doctrine. At
present, in common law countries, the circumstances justifying lifting the
veil of the corporation include: avoiding legal obligations, fraud, agency,
and single economic unit.17 These concepts are addressed in greater detail in
the next section.
Not only does the new veil-piercing doctrine established by Circular
698 fall outside the conventional company law’s veil-piercing rule, but Circular 698 constitutes a regulatory measure based on tax law instead of company law. Circular 698’s consequences to corporate law may be the inadvertent result of an overzealous tax authority. Irrespective of the intended
scope of Circular 698, its impact could be far reaching even though there
are still limited cases with which to predict its application. The following
subsection introduces the common law veil-piercing doctrine to provide the
necessary foundation in analyzing the impact of Circular 698 and its legitimacy as a basis for disregarding limited liability protection—an issue discussed in detail in part two.

15
16
17
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C. Overview of the Common Law Veil-Piercing Doctrine
As mentioned above, the common law veil-piercing doctrine originated in the 1898 landmark British case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. in response to the Companies Act of 1862, the law that first authorized limited
liability for corporations.18 In examining the policies behind veil piercing, it
is important to consider the doctrine’s origins and its modern variations. As
veil-piercing is a common law doctrine, the analysis will include the United
Kingdom, the source of the common law system, and the United States, the
world’s largest economy.
1. Modern British Approach to Piercing the Corporate Veil
Although the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil originated in the United Kingdom, the doctrine is rarely utilized by U.K. courts.
In fact, the doctrine is arguably limited to situations where fraud exists. In
the opinion of the House of Lords in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional
Council, Lord Keith stated a corporate veil could only be pierced “where
special circumstances exist indicating that [use of the corporation] is a mere
façade concealing the true facts”.19
The fraud requirement was reaffirmed in 2013 when the Supreme
Court addressed whether the veil-piercing doctrine is available in the United
Kingdom.20 In VTB Capital Plc v. Nutritek International Corp, the Court
noted the many expressions used by British courts to describe the “façade”
requirement from the House of Lords. These include “the true facts,”
“sham,” “mask,” “cloak,” “device,” and “puppet”.21 The Court went on to
note that most cases where the court pierces the corporate veil are cases
where the defendant shareholder(s) could be held liable through agency or
another theory.22 The court also makes it clear that the concept of façade
should not be mistaken with the concept of ensuring the moral outcome. As
such, it can be reasoned that the main goal of the veil-piercing doctrine in
the United Kingdom is to avoid fraud, not merely to protect investors.
The veil-piercing theory is used more commonly in the United States
and is one of the most commonly litigated issues of corporate law23 making
an analysis of the common approaches in the United States useful to the
policy analysis.

18

Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd, [1897] AC 22 (HL)
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council, [1978] AC 90 (HL) 96 .
20
VTB Capital Plc v. Nutritck Int’l Corp. [2013] UKSC 5, 125.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Chao Xi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There? 5 J. BUS. L. 413, 413
(2011).
19

479

1SHEN_WATTERS -- NEEDS FFC (DO NOT DELETE)

10/21/2015 7:42 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

35:469 (2015)

2. The American Approach to the Veil-Piercing Doctrine
For the purpose of examining the policies underlying the veil-piercing
doctrine, this section will address the doctrine using a general approach because, in the United States, corporate law is created on the state level with
laws being applied according to the state of incorporation. This system results in inconsistent application between the states. The standards for piercing the corporate veil have been broken down into three elements: (1) Domination and Control, (2) Fraud and Misuse of Corporate Form, and (3)
Causation.24 This sub-section will adopt this three-pronged structure to examine the policies underlying the first two elements, which basically divides the grounds for the veil-piercing cases into two categories.25
3. Domination and Control
The issue of domination and control is essential in demonstrating that
a company cannot be viewed as a separate legal entity from the parent. It is
difficult to prove, and many forms of evidence can be used to establish
domination. The element of domination and control can be further broken
down into five factors that the court can weigh in order to determine the existence of domination and control. These factors include corporate formalities, adequate capitalization, intercompany transactions and commingling of
assets, overlap in officers and directors and other miscellaneous factors.26
This is in contrast to Circular 698, which merely requires an economic gain
and an abusive intention, not control.27
(a) Corporate Formalities.
In determining whether there has been domination and control of the
corporation by a shareholder, the court often looks to formalities such as
maintaining separate books, utilizing independent auditors and directors,
and holding separate board meetings.28 The failure to adhere to corporate
formalities alone is not enough to establish domination and control since the
basic corporate principle still can be achieved without strict compliance
with corporate formalities.29 Furthermore, corporate formalities can be met
while domination and control exists. For instance, the same directors can
24
Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165,
1165 (2008).
25
Causation is a fundamental element of most causes of action but offers little value to the policy
analysis.
26
Smith, supra note 24, at 1165.
27
See Circular 698, supra note 4.
28
Smith, supra note 24, at 1173.
29
Id.
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serve on the boards of a parent company and subsidiary without establishing domination and control because the directors owe separate fiduciary duties to the parent and subsidiary. While technically in compliance with corporate formalities, the dual role of the directors provides an opportunity for
domination and control.
Although utilizing the same directors does not establish domination
and control in the legal sense, which may require “improper control or manipulation,” 30 it does demonstrate absolute control in the literal sense. It
therefore follows logically that actual domination and control is not the issue, but the use of fraud while control exists. Analyzing the elements in this
way blurs the line between the first element, control and domination, and
the second, fraud or misuse. This blurring of the lines may contribute to the
inconsistent application of the veil-piercing doctrine and jurisdictional variations.
(b) Adequate Capitalization31
Courts often lend greater credence to the issue of adequate capitalization than other factors. In the United States, corporations do not have a registered capital requirement. This implies that limited liability protection
should exist even without capitalization of the newly formed corporation.
However, the courts have utilized undercapitalization as a basis for disallowing limited liability protection under special circumstances.
The amount of capitalization depends on the type of business and the
degree of risk foreseeable at the time of incorporation of the company.
When a plaintiff is harmed and petitions the court to pierce the veil, the
court cannot simply look to actual harm in determining the adequacy of
capitalization or every corporation failing to pay its debts would fail the inquiry. The Seventh Circuit noted that allocating liability whenever a corporation’s capital fell below an adequate level would harm creditors by imposing needless forced sales. 32 To fail the capitalization requirement, the
amount of capitalization must be “illusory or trifling compared with the
business to be done and the risks of loss.”33

30

Id. at 1174.
Adequate capitalization is a factor in determining whether adequate domination and control exists
to permit piercing the corporate veil. It is distinct from the “thin capitalization rule” which helps determine the deductibility of interest for corporate tax purposes.
32
Smith, supra note 24, at 1176 (citing Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855
F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988)).
33
Id. at 1174 (citing WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 41.33 (perm. ed. 2006)).
31
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(c) Intercompany Transactions and Commingling of Assets
Both in the cases of parent-subsidiary relationships and of shareholders with closely held corporations, transactions between the shareholder and
corporation are commonplace. However, the commingling of assets implies
a lack of separation between the corporation and shareholder. Without the
separation, limited liability protection loses its justification because it is
predicated on the corporation’s status as an independent legal person with
separate finances.34
(d) Overlap in Officers and Directors
As previously discussed, the overlap of officers and directors between
a parent and subsidiary is not inherently improper. However, it can be used
as evidence of domination and control because utilization of the same officers or directors gives the parent an opportunity to control the subsidiary.
Therefore, use of the same directors can facilitate the establishment of control, but it is neither necessarily nor sufficient. That being said, it may be
extremely difficult to establish domination and control without overlap of
officers or directors.35
(e) Other Miscellaneous Factors
The court may look to a variety of factors as evidence of domination
and control. Although the court is free to examine any factors that may suggest domination by the shareholder or parent company, two predominant
factors include joint filings of and the sharing of locations by the parent and
subsidiary. Both companies consolidating their filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Internal Revenue Service can provide evidence of domination. However, like the other factors, this is not dispositive
because it is common and legitimate for a parent and subsidiary to consolidate their annual reports and tax filings.36 In regards to location, if the parent and subsidiary share an office it may lead the court to question the independence of the entities. However, sharing office space is not illegal and is
a legitimate method to save costs. As a result, the court will weigh miscellaneous factors to determine where domination and control exists.37
In determining if there is domination and control, the court is looking
34

See The Business Torts Reporter, Equitable Remedies, 25 BUS. TORTS REP. 308, 310 (2013).
Smith, supra note 24 at 1178.
36
Id. at 1179.
37
See Jeffery W. Warren & Adam Lawton Alpert, Creditors’ and Debtors’ Practice in Florida, CD
FL-CLE 8-1, § 8.18 (2012) which discusses the case of Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v Sykes, where the
court considered location and joint tax filing in piercing the corporate veil. 425 So.2d 594, 599 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982).
35
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to see if the shareholder exercises control over the corporation to the extent
the corporation cannot be said to act as an independent legal person.38 However, the courts are concerned not merely with control, but with the legitimacy of the control. Thus, it seems that the policy behind the first element
is to ensure the purposes of limited liability are met by guaranteeing the
corporation operates as an independent legal person and ensuring that any
control is not improper.
4. Fraud and Misuse of Corporate Form
Shareholder fraud or misuse must be established prior to the court lifting the corporate veil. Lack of independence alone is insufficient to establish shareholder liability. Instead, the plaintiff must prove the corporation is
a “sham” used for “no other purpose than as a vehicle for fraud.” 39 The
mere “use of the corporate form to avoid liability is insufficient to warrant
piercing the veil.”40 As such, merely seeking to avoid tax liability, as is the
subject of Circular 698, is insufficient to pierce the veil. Even so, utilizing
benefits of international legal structures is not tantamount to a sham. This
element ensures that only shareholders abusing the corporate form to engage in fraudulent behavior lose limited liability protection, demonstrating
a policy objective of avoiding fraud.
An examination of the first two factors demonstrates policy objectives
of requiring a corporation to act as an independent legal person within the
intended scope of corporation statutes and to prevent fraud. Therefore, the
policy objectives behind veil piercing can be summarized as (1) preventing
the abuse of the corporate form contrary to the intentions of corporations
law, (2) preventing fraud or intentional misuse of the corporate form in order to (3) prevent harm—especially harm to involuntary creditors or third
parties in tort cases. Circular 698 lacks the aforementioned “law” objectives
and simply seeks to collect tax revenue without regard to the purposes behind the corporate form.
Although Circular 698 is inconsistent with the conventional veilpiercing doctrine, a complete analysis of its justifications and impact requires addressing the legitimacy of Circular 698 both in regards to the authority of the General Administration of Taxation to promulgate Circular
698 and its legitimacy as a new veil-piercing doctrine under the Chinese
company law regime. To this end, the next section focuses on the legitimacy of Circular 698.
38
Dave Rugani, Twenty-First Century Equity: Tailoring the Corporate Veil Piercing Doctrine to
Limited Liability Companies in North Carolina, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 899, 905–06 (2012).
39
Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999).
40
Smith, supra note 24, at 1180 (citing Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Altanttrafik Exp. Serv. Ltd.,
909 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1990) rev’d on other grounds, 982 F,2d 765 (2d Cir. 1992).
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II. LEGITIMACY OF CIRCULAR 698
In assessing the legitimacy of Circular 698, this section begins with an
introduction to the history and importance of limited liability for a foundational understanding of the veil-piercing doctrine. It continues with a review
of the established grounds for lifting the corporate veil and contrasting the
objectives behind these grounds with those of Circular 698. The section
concludes with a discussion of the General Administration of Taxation’s
power to issue rules, such as Circular 698, that effectively bypass the sole
authority of the People’s Congress to regulate fundamental economic and
foreign trade systems.
A. Why Are Corporations Provided Limited Liability Protection?
The concept of the corporation dates back to the Roman Empire where
professional colleges called corpora existed to support the existing institutions of religion, education, and government.41 The later Christian emperors
disbanded most pagan corpora but tolerated some that served key economic
interests.42 With the eventual collapse of the Roman Empire, the corporate
form nearly disappeared.43 Most early businesses in England were sole proprietorships and other entities that lacked limited liability, which was not
available until 1855 with the passage of the Limited Liability Act. The first
corporations were specially chartered by the sovereign44 and it was not until
the Companies Act of 1862 the corporate form became available to common business enterprises.45 Around this time, many US states adopted statutes providing for limited liability. These statutes protected shareholders
from liability beyond their investment in the limited liability business entity, usually a corporation.
Originally, the corporate form was limited to large entities with multiple shareholders, but by the early 1900’s, this changed to allow increased
investment as the industrial revolution came into full swing. Due to state
regulation of limited liability, the process was piecemeal, with New Hampshire granting limited liability for manufacturing companies in 1816 and

41
Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and
Latin America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683, 689 (2012).
42
Id. at 690.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 697. “[I]n 1662, an act of Parliament granted shareholders of the British Fisheries Company,
the British East India Company, and the Royal African Company limited liability. This act came to embody what is now considered the beginning of the principle that the liability of members of a chartered
company was unlimited unless their charter specified that it was limited (internal citations and quotation
omitted).”
45
David J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business
Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 534 (2007).
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New York passing the Limited Partnership Act of 1822.46 The benefits of
limited liability have resulted in a great deal of praise, with limited liability
even being called the “greatest single discovery of modern times.”47
The fundamental arguments supporting limited liability are economic
in nature. Corporations have been described as a “nexus of contracts organizing the relationship between various actors in an enterprise,”48 and limited
liability a corporation’s most important feature.49 Limited liability protection extends to all shareholders and allows them to invest whilst secure in
the knowledge their other assets are safe from efforts to collect against corporate liabilities.50 Prior to the advent of limited liability, wealthy investors
shouldered significant risk when making an investment. Not only could the
investor lose their personal fortunes, but the wealthiest investors would be
the target of collection attempts by the company’s creditors. This structure
limited the motivation to invest and created a disincentive to diversifying
investments because investing even a small amount could cause the investor
to lose his great fortune. In order to protect their investments and wealth,
investors need to research the company and monitor its operation to avoid
risk. Those with some capital to invest but unable to afford the monitoring
costs may avoid investment altogether.51 There would be no venture capital
markets and the concept of angel investors would be non-existent without
limited liability protection. The initial investigation and monitoring costs
could be prohibitive to many potential wealthy investors and cut into potential returns, thereby eliminating the incentive to invest.
The established arguments in favor of limited liability include decreased monitoring costs, free transferability of shares, market efficiency,
diversification of investments and incentive to invest in riskier projects.52
All five factors relate to an incentive to increase investments that will benefit the society as a whole through the promotion of economic growth. Decreased monitoring costs allow investment in more projects and permit the
less wealthy to invest. Free transferability of shares allows for short-term
investment and the involvement of new investors. Diversification allows for
smaller projects to receive funding thereby encouraging entrepreneurism
and innovation. Limited liability allows for the funding of important but
risky projects that may not otherwise have an opportunity to raise sufficient
46

Figueroa, supra note 41, at 703.
Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 356 (1979)
(quoting the President of Columbia University).
48
Morrissey, supra at 537 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985)).
49
Figueroa, supra note 41, at 705.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 706. Describes the lower monitoring cost benefit of limited liability as the “democratic argument” because it encourages individuals with less wealth to invest.
52
Id.
47
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capital. Limited liability also supports investment and market efficiency
through reducing creditor costs. When a creditor enters into a relationship
with a corporation it only needs to examine the assets and debts of the corporation. Without limited liability, the creditor would need to examine the
financial situations of shareholders to determine the likelihood of repayment.
The main argument against limited liability is that creditors and society shoulder the risk of non-payment of corporate liabilities. This externalization of cost places a burden on society and may harm innocent parties.
The counter view is that limited liability “constitutes a subsidy aimed at
fostering investment.”53 Voluntary creditors know the risk of non-payment
when they enter into agreements. Besides, they are protected by the general
rules of the contract law, and are always able to bargain better terms in voluntary transactions by imposing more stringent terms and conditions on the
borrowing entity. Therefore, creditors can factor in the risk of nonpayment
and increase the interest rates to match the risk.54 This allows limited liability to be characterized as a societal “subsidy” that promotes investment and
economic growth.55 “Courts within the United States, in turn, have recognized the intimate connection between limited liability and the overall economic growth of the country, implying that the corporate limited liability
form is a quintessential tool for the expansion of capitalism.”56
Bearing these general pros and cons in mind, the rest of this section
looks into the legitimacy of Circular 698 mainly on two perspectives. First,
is Circular 698 a specific application of the veil-piercing doctrine under the
Company Law? Second, is the new rule of lifting the veil outlined by the
tax authority in line with the PRC Legislation Law?
B. Is Circular 698 a Specific Application of the Veil-Piercing
Doctrine Under the Company Law?
China formally introduced the veil-piercing doctrine into the Company
Law in 2005. 57 However, Chinese law only draws very narrow boundaries.58 Article 20(3) of the Company Law provides that: “Where any of the
shareholders of a company evades debts by abusing the company’s independent status as a legal person or shareholders’ limited liability, thus seri53

Id. at 707.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. (citing Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry,
55 Denv. L.J. 1, 8, 12–13 (1978) and JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS §§ 7.7, 7.11 (1995)) (internal
citation omitted).
57
See PRC Company Law, supra note 10, at arts. 20(3), 64.
58
See generally Hui Huang, An Empirical Study on the Veil-piercing System in China, 1 CHINESE J.
L. 10 (2012).
54
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ously damaging the interests of any creditor of the company, it shall be held
jointly liable for the debts of the company.” Article 64 of the Company Law
provides that if the assets of the company and the single shareholder are integrated and indivisible, then the shareholder and company will be jointly
liable for the debts of the company. Article 18 of the second piece of judicial interpretation, that is, the Provisions of Certain Issues Concerning the
Application of the Company Law, published by China’s Supreme People’s
Court on May 12, 2008, effective as of May 19, 2008, covering a variety of
issues related to the dissolution and liquidation of Chinese companies, provides the circumstances in which the shareholders and company are jointly
liable for the debts in the bankruptcy proceeding.59
It appears clear that the scenario related to asset integration or company liquidation is different from the transactions Circular 698 is intended to
address. Then, is Circular 698 a possible result of applying the veil-piercing
doctrine under the Company Law? There are some stark differences between Article 20(3) of the Company Law and Circular 698.
The Company Law does not give any specific example or define any
way of abusing the corporate form. It is widely recognized that there are
generally four categories of cases in which the corporate form can be
deemed to be abused: a significant lack of corporate capital, confusing corporate personality, excessive control of the subsidiary by the parent company and avoidance of legal (i.e. contractual) obligations by the misuse of the
company’s independent legal personality. 60 Among them, avoiding legal
obligations by the use of the company’s independent legal personality usually refers to the case that the controlling shareholders abuse the legal personality of the new or existing company (in most cases subsidiaries or affiliated companies) to achieve the real purpose of avoiding legal obligations.
Apparently, the underlying reason to pierce the veil in this case is that the
shareholders may damage social and public interests and effectiveness of
the law while complying with law in an artificial way.61 What the Company
Law tries to address is Chinese entities or shareholders who abuse the legal
personality rule. In other words, the veil will be pierced if a Chinese parent

59

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa Ruogan
Wenti de Guiding (ed) (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定 (二) )
[Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law
of the People’s Republic of China (II)] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court May 12, 2008, effective May 19, 2008), art. 8.
60
The four factors are often condensed or labeled differently but the underlying legal justifications
remain the same. See generally, David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility,
and the Limits of Limited Liability (Wash. & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2006-08),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959.
61
Xiaorui Li & Dongmie Li, Research on the Doctrine of Disregarding Corporate Personality in
China: The Application of Article 20 of PRC Company Law in Judicial Practice, ADVANCED THEORY
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE OF CORPORATE LAW 110–13 (Lanfang Liu ed., 2009).
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company abuses its subsidiary’s legal personality to avoid its legal obligations.
Circular 698, on the other hand, tends to prevent non-resident enterprises (which can be owned by Chinese or foreign investors) from avoiding
their liability to pay Chinese enterprise income tax so as to protect the Chinese tax base. Different from the Company Law, the target of Circular 698
can be either Chinese or foreign investors. In this sense, Circular 698 creates an extraterritorial effect, which may bring impact onto the commercial
transactions in a cross-border context. This extraterritorial nature will predominantly focus the impact of Circular 698 on foreign investors. The other
difference between the Company Law and Circular 698 in terms of the veilpiercing rule lies in the definition of “creditor.” There is still an intense debate on the scope of the company creditors mentioned in Article 20(3) of
Company Law, which may include both creditors in civil or commercial relations and special creditors in administrative relations such as the tax authority. 62 The creditors in Circular 698 arguably refer to tax authorities.
However, some empirical research indicates that Chinese courts have thus
far not expanded the scope of creditors in the veil-piercing cases to cover
special creditors like tax or other government authorities.63
Article 20(3) of the Company Law allocates liability between the
shareholder and company. First, the shareholder and the company bear joint
liability for the company debt. This suggests a pre-condition for the liability
allocation that the company itself must have a debt so that the shareholder
can bear the liability. Second, the company’s legal personality remains intact and the shareholders abusing the company’s independent personality
are jointly liable for the company’s debts with the company, making the application of this provision similar to penetrating the veil. However, according to Circular 698, no matter whether the veil of the offshore holding company is lifted or not, the occurrence of the company’s debt is not a
necessary condition. Rather, an offshore transfer of equity technically is a
triggering event which causes the application of Circular 698. This is an expansive attempt to extend the veil-piercing doctrine to other circumstances
which may not damage any third party in normal commercial transactions.
Further, Article 6 of Circular 698—which denies the corporate form of the
offshore holding company which is used for tax planning purposes—does
not fall in the conventional categories of penetrating the corporate veil.
These distinctions between Article 20(3) and Circular 698 suggest that Circular 698 is not a pure repetition of the veil-piercing doctrine established by
the Company Law, and deserves closer scrutiny.
The other way to look into Circular 698 is to see whether it falls into
any category of veil-piercing theory developed by cases in common law ju62
63
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risdictions. In the corporate group context, there appears to be a limited basis for piercing the corporate veil. This basis is articulated using several different concepts: “agency,” single economic unit, and the façade category.
These concepts are used to pierce the corporate veil in cases involving the
absence of any activity in the subsidiary company and the failure of a parent
company to treat the entity as a separate being; to be respectful of its existence. We turn to these concepts and use them to comprehend the veilpiercing doctrine established in Circular 698.
1. Agency
Without a clear agency agreement, the court usually does not presume
that the company is the agent of the shareholders and it is also hard for the
plaintiff in the case to prove an agency relationship between the shareholders and company. 64 There are some subtle differences between the veillifting rule in Circular 698 and agency theory here. The agency relationship
is not a decisive element specified by Circular 698 in lifting the corporate
veil. Rather, Circular 698 emphasizes the facts that: (i) there is a parentsubsidiary relationship; (ii) there is an offshore holding company bridging
the parent and subsidiary; and (iii) the corporate structure is designed for
some tax purposes. Nor does the agency relationship justify veil piercing
under Circular 698. The agency relationship typically involves the explicit
or implicit appointment of the company (in most cases, a wholly owned
subsidiary) to act on behalf of the shareholder in relation to some activities.65 In piercing the veil, the court usually focuses upon whether the subsidiary has been given authority to act on behalf of and legally bind the parent company. Once the veil is pierced, the shareholder would be liable for
the actions of the agent in contract or in tort provided that the agent is acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority. The veil-piercing
rule in Circular 698, however, does not follow from the relationship of
agency, even though Circular 698 may generate the same legal outcome.
In the case of Smith, Stone, and Knight Ltd v. of Birmingham Corporation, Judge Atkinson summed up many cases of lifting the corporate veil
related to tax66 and pointed out that the existence of the agency relationship
PAUL L. DAVIS, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 187 (7th ed.
2003); KAREN VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 70 (2007); DEREK FRENCH,
STEPHEN MAYSON & CHRISTOPHER RYAN, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 133 (27th ed.
2010–2011).
65
For a comparison of the role of agency between the US and UK, see generally Thomas K. Cheng,
The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the English and the U.S. Corporate Veil
Doctrines, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329 (2011).
66
Smith, Stone, and Knight Ltd v. Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All E.R. 116, 121 (KB). However, the Court concluded that in all the cases, the question was whether the company, in this case an
English company, could be taxed in respect of all the profits made by a subsidiary company which is
64
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must meet the following six conditions simultaneously: (i) the profit of the
subsidiary must be treated directly as that of the parent company; (ii) the
subsidiary’s management personnel must be selected entirely by the parent
company; (iii) the parent company must be the final decision maker over
the subsidiary; (iv) the parent company must fully control the subsidiary including its management and capital structure; (v) the parent company must
obtain profit through the control and management of the subsidiary; (vi) and
the parent company must have effective and sustainable control of the subsidiary.67 It is clear that the core of these six factors is the control the parent
company has over the subsidiary company. Therefore, under the agency
theory, shareholders must have a high degree of control over the company
so as to regard the company as the agent of the shareholders. In determining
whether the subsidiary is an agent, the court’s analysis goes towards determining whether the subject company behaves as one independent entity or
merely a puppet of the parent.
Circular 698, however, fails to specify this control element between
the parent and subsidiary, even though it includes a parenthesis after the
term of the “foreign investor” which notes the “actual controlling party.” 68
Nor does Circular 698 clarify what the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship must be in order to justify veil piercing. In the Circular on Several
Issues relating to the Administration of EIT for Non-resident Enterprises,
issued by the State Administration of Taxation in 2011 (Guo Shui Han
[2011] Circular No. 24), the term “foreign investor” is defined as “all the
foreign investors who indirectly transfer the equity of the Chinese resident
enterprises.”69 This seems to suggest that Circular 698 may apply even if
there is no high level of control or a complete lack of control.70 This subtle
difference shows Circular 698’s dramatic departure from the conventional
veil-piercing doctrine, indicating a more expansive approach to interpreting
the key concept of “control.”
operated elsewhere. Therefore, the conclusion is somewhat different from the circumstances in Circular
698 under which income, itself, is obtained by the non-resident investors.
67
Id.; see HUI HUANG, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHINA 117 (2011). However, the status of this case as authority is somewhat suspect.
Cf. JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Dept. of Trade [1989] Ch 72; Yukong Lines Ltd Of Korea v
Rendsburg Investments Corporation et al; (The “Rialto”) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32; Munton
Brothers v. Secretary of State [1983] NI 369. The notion that control alone could result in disregarding
the corporate entity would be inconsistent with Salomon v. Salomon. But “a denial of justice to the incorporator where there is no abuse factor” distinguishes Salomon v. Salomon in which such a factor was
not in issue.
68
Circular 698, supra note 4, at art. 5.
69
Guanyu Fei Juming Qiye Suodeshui Guanli Ruogan Wenti de Gonggao [Circular on Several Issues relating to the Administration of EIT for Non-resident Enterprises, issued by the State Administration of Taxation on March 28, 2011 (Guo Shui Han [2011] No. 24, or “Circular 24”)], Section 6 (3).
70
A non-controlling stakeholder profiting from assets that appreciated in China would be liable for
tax obligations on the gains attributable to the assets in China irrespective of their lack of control over
the investment.
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2. Single Economic Unit
The single economic unit theory suggests that the court may regard all
the members within a corporate group as a single entity and may not consider the legal personality of each member.71 However, the House of Lords
put a question mark on this theory in the case of Woolfson72 and, in the
Cape Industries case, the court cited the judgment related to the single economic unit theory in the case of Bank of Tokyo to explain its stance: “[the
plaintiff] holds that we are too rigid to strictly differentiate between the parent company and the subsidiary company in this case. In his opinion, from
the economic point of view, they are a whole. However, our concern is not
the economy but the law. From the legal point of view, there is an unbridgeable gap between the parent company and the subsidiary, so they
should be strictly distinguished.”73 This stance is a self-constraining one,
restricting the court from expansively piercing the corporate veil and undermining the limited liability principle.
On its face, the single economic unit theory seems a sensible and relevant approach upon which companies and corporate groups can rely. Company B and C may be grouped together and characterized as a single economic unit.74 However, it can also be seen from the case law jurisprudence
that there is no clear-cut approach to applying the single economic unit theory, which leaves the application controversial and inconsistent. And, even
those who support this theory have to admit that the control of the subsidiaries by the parent company is the most critical prerequisite for the theory’s
application.75 Only when the parent company excessively controls the subsidiary can the parent and subsidiary be regarded as a whole.76 The focus of
Lord Denning’s analysis in the case of DHN Food Distributor, for example,
appears directed at the complete control by the parent over the subsidiary.77
The control can be in existence in the form of an agreement, but in most
cases it takes the form of direct equity holding. The notion of control brings
out the other two grounds for piercing the veil: (i) the absence of activity of
the subsidiary, and (ii) the complete identity of interests in a parent71
Vandekerckhove, supra note 16, at 72; See DHN Food Distributors v. Towler Hamlets London
Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA) for an application of the single economic unit theory.
72
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] SC 90 (HL).
73
Adams and Others v. Cape Industries plc. and Another [1990] Ch 433 (AC) 538; Bank of Tokyo
Ltd v. Karoon [1987] AC 45 (AC) 64.
74
See Figure 1 above for a visual representation of the relationship between B and C.
75
Vandekerckhove, supra note 16, at 528.
76
Of course, only one element of “control” is not enough to lift the veil under the single economic
unit theory, which also requires other elements such as commingling of assets, business operations, and
legal personalities between corporations.
77
Lord Justice Shaw, in the case of DHN, also considered the factor of doing “justice” to the facts.
In his view, strict adherence to the legal reality created by incorporation does not generate an abuse of
the law but rather results in a “denial of justice.”
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subsidiary relationship. In this sense, the agency relationship is a subcategory of control.
The application of Circular 698 however does not require excessive
control of the Chinese Company C by Company B. According to Announcement No. 24,78 an “offshore investor (party with effective control)”
refers to all the foreign investors that have indirectly transferred the equity
interests in the Chinese resident enterprise and does not have to be the one
which has actual control over the Chinese resident enterprise. This means
that the tax liability is imposed even if Company B only holds 1% of equity
in Company C.79 Following this line of logic, it appears that Circular 698 is
not premised on the single economic unit theory.
3. Avoiding Legal Obligations/Fraud
The primary legal framework through which a court determines
whether the corporate veil can be pierced, that the corporate veil can only
be pierced “where special circumstances exist indicating that [the company]
is a mere façade concealing the true facts”, is a core principle articulated in
the case of Tunstall v. Steigmann.80 When the shareholders achieve the purpose of avoiding legal obligations or defrauding by the use of the company’s separate legal personality, the court may hold that the company is “only a façade hiding the facts”.81 Then, the court may make the shareholders
and company liable for the obligations the shareholders try to avoid,82 or
ignore the veil of the corporation and deny the existence of the company. 83
In the cases of Gilford Motor and Jones v. Lipman, the defendants both attempted to establish the company to evade their existing contractual obligations, and the judges in both cases lifted the corporate veil.84 Here, the parties involved must try to avoid existing obligations rather than future or
potential obligations.85
Back to Circular 698, Company A sets up Company B which in turn
78

See Shuiwu, supra note 69.
This might be more stringent than some earlier interpretations (or guesses) of the rules, whereby
parties without the majority perspective would not be subject to Circular 698. Non-resident investors,
which had sought to get around Circular 698 reporting requirements by contending that they do not have
“effective control” over the Chinese resident enterprise, would also be obliged to comply with these requirements by virtue of Announcement No. 24.
80
[1962] 2 QB 593. It requires mentioning that the House of Lords in the UK, for instance, did not
elaborate on the nature of such special circumstances or the meaning of “façade.” Nevertheless, following Adams v Cape Industries Plc, the “façade concealing the true facts” test has become the primary
reference point for any lawyer investigating whether it is possible to pierce the corporate veil.
81
Woolfson v. Strathclyde, [1978] SC 90 (HL) 96.
82
DEREK FRENCH ET AL., MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 150 (27th ed. 2010–2011).
83
Vandekerckhove, supra note 16, at 71; Davis, supra note 64, at 185.
84
Gilford Motor Co Ltd v. Horne [1933] Ch. 935 (CA); Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 (ChD).
85
Julie Cassidy, Corporations Law, Text and Essential Cases 56–57 (2d ed. 2008).
79
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holds Company C’s equity. It may constitute avoiding existing obligations
(of Company A). However, what Company A tries to avoid is not its existing but future obligations. Therefore, it is not consistent with the veilpiercing principle, that is, avoidance of existing legal obligations. Circular
698 appears to cross the boundary and constitutes a new veil-piercing rule.
C. Is the New Veil-Lifting Rule in Line With the PRC Legislation
Law?
The question of legitimacy is central to the evaluation of taxation.
There is a comparative way of evaluating legitimacy. In a Western context,
as taxation is a matter of raising state finance for the public good, the overriding aim of taxation is effectiveness on the basis of estimations of the patterns of compliance, non-compliance and avoidance. Legitimacy in this
sense combines the interrelated issues of equity and effectiveness. The consequence of a lack of legitimacy will lead to a difficulty of political acceptability and enforcement. A system which has problems of enforceability
and effectiveness will tend to lose political acceptance. Fairness in the context of taxation has two functions. First, it is to ensure that individual businesses pay their fair share of tax in relation to their commercial profits and
compete on a level playing field. Fairness in this context involves a process
of comparing a company’s commercial profit level with the amount of corporate tax that it is paying and then that of comparing that tax level with
other, similar companies in similar transactions. The other function is to
correct market failures that impose wider costs on society. Fairness is
viewed as being on par with efficiency as a value shaping the corporation
tax law, as a fair and efficient tax regime is the key instrument in distributive justice.86 Tax avoidance and anti-avoidance legislation are vivid examples to show the implications for the concept of fairness in taxation.
In the Chinese context, the question is more jurisprudential with an
administrative law dimension. The legality of Circular 698 can be judged
by reference to the “science of legislation.” The question is more about
whether Circular 698 is a lawful regulation under the authority granted by
the legislature.87 Since the way to “pierce the veil” under Circular 698 can86

Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership 12 (2000); A. Sen, On Economic Inequality 22–23 (2007).
87
Readers unfamiliar with Chinese law may wonder why a private party has not sued the General
Administration of Taxation to challenge the Circular 698. To be sure, the United States Administrative
Procedures Act allows private parties to challenge administrative regulations if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2015), which
includes regulations that exceed a legislative grant of authority. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v.
F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (reiterating the principle that courts hearing challenges to agency
rulemaking must always question “whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority”). In the United Kingdom, courts also can strike down ultra vires agency regulations at the in-
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not be equated to a specific application of Article 20(3) of the Company
Law, it may be considered as a new veil-piercing doctrine created by the
State Administration of Taxation. The question is then whether the State
Administration of Taxation has due power or authority to formulate such a
veil-piercing doctrine through Circular 698 to replace or supplement the one
in the Company Law.
Article 8(8) of the PRC Legislation Law provides that the “fundamental economic system and basic fiscal, tax, customs, financial and foreign
trade systems” can only be formulated in law by the legislature, that is, the
National People’s Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee.88 According
to the interpretation of Article 8 of the Legislation Law provided by the
NPC, the Company Law is a piece of legislation regulating the “basic economic system.”89 As the company’s separate legal personality is the cornerstone of the Company Law, it lays the foundation of the modern economic
system.90 Thus, the basic company law doctrines such as the veil-piercing
norm must be included in law other than regulations, a fact which has been
clarified in Article 8 of the Legislation Law. The nature of Circular 698 is
to lift the veil of a company even though that company is incorporated in an
offshore jurisdiction. As such, the rules in Circular 698 touch upon the separate legal personality and limited liability principles, the fundamental core
principles of modern company law. Following this line of analysis, the rules
outlined in Circular 698 should be legislated by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee. To implement these rules, it is the State
Council that can enact administrative regulations with the delegated authority from the NPC or its Standing Committee.91 In any event, without
due delegation of power from the NPC or the State Council, the State Administration of Taxation has no legislative or regulatory power to make these rules in the form of an administrative notice.
The State Administration of Taxation may argue that its power to

stance of a private party. See, e.g., R v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (ex parte Hedge & Butler
Ltd), (1986) 2 All ER 164 (DC). China, however, does not afford such a cause of action to private parties. While China recently amended its Administrative Procedure Law to clarify that private parties
could sue agencies for actions that infringed on their legal rights and interests, the legislature expressly
forbade courts from hearing private suits seeking to have agency rules, regulations, and decisions invalidated. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zingzheng Susong Fa [Xiuding] (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
[修订]) [Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised)] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective May 1, 2015), arts. 11–12.
88
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) [The Law on Legislation of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1,
2000), art. 8(8) [hereinafter PRC Law on Legislation].
89
See Falu Wenda yu Shiyi [Interpretation of Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing
Committee on Legislation Law] http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/xianfa/2001-08/01/content_
140407.htm (last visited May 11, 2012) (China).
90
Vandekerckhove, supra note 16, at 3–4.
91
PRC Law on Legislation, supra note 88, at art. 5.
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promulgate Circular 698 can originate from Article 47 of PRC Enterprise
Income Tax Law, which reads: “Where an enterprise makes any other arrangement not for any reasonable business purpose, if its taxable revenue or
income decreases, the tax organ has the power to make an adjustment
through a reasonable method.”92
According to Article 120 of the Regulation on the Implementation of
the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, the term
“without reasonable business objectives” means that “the main purpose is
[the] reduction, exemption or deferral of tax payments.”93 That the foreign
company indirectly transfers the Chinese company’s equity through an offshore holding company to avoid the Chinese enterprise income tax may
possibly constitute an “arrangement without reasonable business objectives.” This way of defining “without reasonable business objectives” is a
black or white approach which may oversimplify the complexity of commercial transactions. A typical transnational company has a high degree of
discretion over its corporate or financial structure so that it can devise optimal routes for internal transactions within the firm through its chains of affiliates. To form intermediary entities in convenient jurisdictions is a critically important part of this overall discretion, which is generally protected
by the basic modern company law principles. To set up an intermediary entity in a tax haven jurisdiction is often specifically for the purposes of reducing tax liability and optimizing economic benefits. A transnational company has a natural right to adopt such techniques so as to take advantage of
the limitations of the tax treaty system and hence reduce its cost of capital,
making it gain a substantial competitive advantage. Arguably, these are important and reasonable business objectives and strategies.
The scenario caught up by Circular 698 is quite unique: it may form a
concrete manifestation of making adjustments by the tax authority in accordance with authorization under Article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax
Law, but the adjustment is, on the other hand, related to the veil-lifting doctrine which in turn affects the cornerstone principle under modern company
law. Additionally, the extraterritorial impact improperly steps into the realm
of “foreign trade systems.” The power exercised by the State Administration of Taxation, apparently, is ultra vires, an act beyond its scope of authority or power under the PRC Legislation Law.
China’s tax authority has been given greater autonomy from the government, with targets and performance plans to meet those targets, with the
overall aim of achieving “efficiency gains.” However such autonomy has
92

PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law, supra note 1, at art. 47.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qi Ye Suo Deshui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li (中华人民共和国企业所得
税法实施条例, 第 512 号) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (Order of State Council No. 512, promulgated Nov. 28, 2007, effective Jan.
1, 2008), art. 120.
93
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not been put in a defined remit. While administrative autonomy may lead to
some improvements in collecting taxes, these improvements tend to be
short term. Further, taxpayers may complain of overzealous enforcement.
The challenge here is whether an autonomous tax regime itself can be generally accepted as fair and desirable in a world where the structures of social solidarity binding citizens together and to their state have become increasingly fragmented.
In summary, the State Administration of Taxation has no power to either create new rules or implement changes to the veil-piercing doctrine by
denying the separate legal personality rule—particularly when the affected
enterprise is an offshore company. Likely, a Chinese court may invalidate
any administrative action taken by the tax authority on the basis of Circular
698 according to the Legislation Law94 if an offshore company challenges
the legitimacy of Circular 698.
III. IS CIRCULAR 698 CREATING A NEW VEIL-PIERCING
DOCTRINE?
In examining the role of Circular 698 in creating a new veil-piercing
doctrine not part of the pre-existing statutory regime, it is important to examine the doctrine as established in China. The article discussed the original common law principle of veil piercing above; however, the principle only applies to China to the extent it is expressly adopted. This section first
looks to the established veil-piercing doctrine as it exists in China. Next, it
compares the policies behind the Circular 698 and piercing the corporate
veil. After establishing the principles courts may utilize in applying Circular
698, the section concludes with examples of recent administrative enforcement of the Circular 698.
A. China’s Adoption of the Veil-Piercing Doctrine
The veil-piercing doctrine existed in China to a limited extent through
judicial application prior to the enactment of China’s Company Law in
2005. In addition to the veil-piercing doctrine, two “quasi veil-piercing
rules” existed.95 The two quasi veil-piercing rules include violation of the
registered capital rules and violation of the capital maintenance rules. 96
94
Zuigao Renmin fayuan Guanyu Yinfa Guanyu Shenli Hang Zheng Anjian Shiyong Falu Guifan
Wenti De Zuotan Hui Jiyao de Tongzhi (最高人民法院關于印發《關于審理行政案件適用法律規範
問題的座談會紀要》的通知, 法[2004]96 号) [Circular of the Supreme People’s Court on Printing and
Issuing the Summary of the Symposium on Issues Concerning Applicable Legal Norms for the Trial of
Administrative Cases, Fa [2004] No. 96] (promulgated and effective May 18, 2008) (China).
95
Xi supra note 23, at 415 (describing enforcement of statutes that have the effect of holding shareholders liable for corporate debts as “quasi-veil-piercing rules”)
96
Id. at 415–16.
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Through the two quasi veil-piercing rules, investors will lose their limited
liability protection if the corporation failed to meet the minimum registered
capital requirement or if the registered capital is improperly removed from
the corporation causing the registered capital to fall below the required level.
Unlike the United States, Chinese law requires registered capital when
organizing a business. The amount of registered capital varies depending on
the type of business organization and the nature of the industry, with high
risk industries requiring greater capital. Between 1994 and 2003, judicial
interpretations made by the Supreme People’s Court determined that piercing the veil of a subsidiary is allowed if the subsidiary fails to meet the minimum registered capital requirement, or after meeting the requirement, falls
below the level the corporation is required to maintain.97
In 2003, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) published a draft set of judicial interpretations addressing issues of corporate law including the veilpiercing rule under the heading “shareholders’ direct liability to the corporate creditors.”98 The draft judicial interpretations provided six articles addressing the scope of the veil-piercing doctrine.99 The first article (art. 48)
reiterates the basic principle of limited liability and limits the court’s ability
to ignore the corporate form to the situation prescribed in the following five
articles. Article 49 limits the standing of plaintiffs to creditors of the corporation that wish to hold the controlling shareholder liable.100 The creditor
must have suffered harm as a result of the controlling shareholder abusing
their limited liability protection.101
Article 51 lists three circumstances under which the controlling shareholders can be held liable.102 These situations include:
a) The company’s income is not separated from the controlling
shareholders’ income;
b) The funds of the company and shareholder are commingled
and both utilize the same accounts; and
c) The commingling of company and personal assets while the
business is under the control of the controlling shareholder.
Under these standards, the court does not look for fraud or wrongdoing
97

Id. at 415.
Id. at 418 (citing Guanyu Shenli Gongsi JiuFen Anjian RuoganWenti de Guiding (Yi)
(ZhengqiuYijianGao) [Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the Adjudication of Cases Involving
Company Disputes (I) (Consultation Draft)] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, effective
Nov. 3, 2003) (China)).
99
Id. (Articles 48–53 apply to piercing the corporate veil).
100
Id. at 419.
101
Id.
102
Id.
98
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but merely looks for abuse of the corporate entity.103 This is similar to the
US approach of requiring domination and control and causation but without
the fraud element. It should be noted that under the US standard, the first
element requires misuse through domination and control, and not merely
control. As a result, the Chinese standard can be seen as placing greater importance on adherence to corporate laws and regulations than to the issue of
fraud.
The 2005 Company Law was drafted with contributions from several
key government agencies and the article was adopted after significant political debate, which probably led to its lack of clear standards. 104 Several
agencies and large State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) advocated “transplanting the common law doctrine into the new Chinese company law.” 105 It
seemed that a specified approach to the veil-piercing doctrine would be
codified until SASAC objected to the language, potentially because the
veil-piercing doctrine may put SOEs at risk of losing limited liability protection106—something that was not previously allowed under the company
law. The Legislative Affairs Office suggested the SPC set the standards for
piercing the corporate veil.107 The National People’s Congress did not adopt
formal language authorizing the SPC to set the standard for veil piercing
but passed the veil-piercing provision in the form of Article 20(3) in the
Company Law.
The lack of clear standards under Article 20 is apparently the result of
internal government controversy regarding application of the doctrine.
However, the fact that clear standards were not established lends credence
to several arguments. One of the strongest arguments includes the idea that
the NPC intended the application of the veil-piercing doctrine to remain
similar to the approach used prior to the 2005 Company Law. Another is
that the NPC intended the adoption of the common law doctrine.108 Although the common law doctrine and the approach adopted in China prior to
the passage of the 2005 Company Law are similar, from a policy perspective they are distinct in that only the common law approach places emphases on the existence of fraud as a prerequisite for removing limited liability
protection. As such, it is debatable whether the avoidance of fraud is a policy objective of the Chinese veil-piercing doctrine. For the purpose of analy103

Id.
Id. at 423 (The agencies include the State Administration for Industry and Commerce [SAIC],
China’s company registrar, the Ministry of Commerce [MOFCOM], China’s main approval authority for
the formation of FIEs, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission [SASAC],
China’s SOE watchdog, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission [CSRC], China’s securities
regulator).
105
Id. at 424.
106
Xi, supra note 23, at 426.
107
Id. at 428 (“The SPC shall determine the specific circumstances under which the shareholders are
held jointly liable for the debts of the company.”).
108
For more on the formation of China’s veil-piercing law, see Xi, supra note 23.
104
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sis in this article, fraud will be included as a valid policy consideration for
the veil-piercing doctrine, regardless of its utilization by Chinese courts.
B. Circular 698 and Veil-Piercing Policy Objectives
Due to Circular 698’s effect of lifting the corporate veil, one aspect of
its legitimacy is the similarity of policy objectives between veil piercing,
aimed at preventing abuse of the corporate form and preventing fraud, and
Circular 698, aimed at tax collection. Therefore, this subsection examines
the effect of Circular 698 in relation to the three major policy objectives
previously identified for piercing the corporate veil and discusses tax considerations targeted by Circular 698 as a fourth policy topic. The topics include preventing abuse of the corporate form contrary to the intentions of
corporate law, preventing fraud or intentional misuse of the corporate form,
preventing harm to involuntary creditors and anti-tax avoidance measures
respectively.
1. Preventing Abuse of the Corporate Form Contrary to the
Intentions of Corporate Law
Under the circumstances outlined in Circular 698, the shareholders are
not seeking to abuse the corporate form but instead failing to pay local taxes
simply because the transaction was conducted outside the jurisdiction of
China. The veil-piercing doctrine is an exception to the limited liability
principle, and effectively acts as a remedy in specific abuses of limited liability. However, limited liability plays no role in the application of Circular
698, which is demonstrated by the fact that the tax liability under Circular
698 would be the same regardless of whether the business entity held limited liability protection. The stark differences between abusing the corporate
form and failing to pay taxes demonstrate the inapplicability of this policy
objective to Circular 698.
2. Preventing Fraud or Intentional Misuse of the Corporate Form
The policy objective of this element is to avoid fraud where the use of
the corporate form is a mere sham. Circular 698 lacks a requirement for
shareholders to intend abusing the limited liability protection of the corporation and Circular 698 does not require actual fraudulent behavior. The absence of a legitimate business purpose other than tax avoidance is not tantamount to fraud. As a result, the policy objectives of this element are not in
line with the objectives of Circular 698.
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3. Preventing Harm to Involuntary Creditors
In regard to the collection of tax proceeds, the government can most
closely be analogized as a voluntary creditor. Although the government
does not negotiate directly with the company regarding transactions and the
applicable tax rate, the government does decide what transactions and business structures are authorized and the corresponding tax rates. Therefore,
the government cannot be characterized as a victim if it loses money
through tax planning in the same way an injury tort victim is harmed. Being
characterized as a voluntary creditor, when a company structures itself in a
manner consistent with the law, the government is analogous to a business
creditor taking advantage of a contractual term. Therefore, the fact that the
government loses potential income is not the same as a corporation abusing
its form to avoid payment to a harmed creditor.
4. Anti-avoidance Measures Against the Systematization of Tax
Avoidance
In the past decades, multinationals have widely used various strategies
to avoid or evade tax. One of the basic methods is to change the recipient,
combined with the technique of re-characterizing the nature of payments.
More often, intermediary entities such as companies, trusts and partnerships
are incorporated in suitable jurisdictions and used to channel assets, transactions and income. By doing so, taxation is likely to be minimized based on
utilizing preferential tax structures from residence in the home country of
the investor or transnational company or in the country where the business
takes place. What Circular 698 tries to tackle is a scenario in which an intermediary company is formed in a jurisdiction which has a suitable tax
treaty with China, a source country. The addition of the intermediary company helps reduce or eliminate source taxation. The purpose of incorporating the intermediary company is to entitle the investor to the benefit of the
treaty even though the company itself is essentially a passive entity, whose
function is to channel the income flow.
This “stepping stone” strategy may be legally valid but is of doubtful
legitimacy from a policy perspective, largely because the underlying rationale of existing tax treaties is to assume that investors are bona fide residents and normal taxpayers. The use of an intermediary company is a form
of treaty shopping, taking advantage of the fictions of legal personality and
state jurisdiction.109 The consequence of this, as well as the popular “roundtripping” model in China (as discussed in detail below), is tantamount to
outright tax evasion. The general tax avoidance or tax abuse principle in tax
109
S. Picciotto, Offshore: The State as Legal Fiction, in OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTRES AND TAX
HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 43–79 (M.P. Hampton & J. P. Abbot et al. eds., 1999).
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law supports the idea that these intermediary companies be regarded as a
sham and can be disregarded. However, just because the use of offshore
companies to evade tax liability is a sham within the context of tax policy,
that does not make the corporations involved shams as the term is used in
company law, which refers to the company being a mere “façade” used to
take advantage of limited liability protection. Seen from this angle, Circular
698 then is a move to fill in regulatory loopholes. The source country,
therefore, can claw back into its tax net the retained worldwide earnings of
these intermediary firms. Against this background, Circular 698 can be regarded as a set of measures to counteract avoidance of source taxation and
to deal with market inefficiency.110 China, as the source state, effectively
denies tax treaty benefits to recipients which it considers to be actually passive entities.
C. Administrative Enforcement of Circular 698
Article 6 of Circular 698 states that:
Where a foreign investor (actual controlling party) indirectly transfers the equity of a Chinese resident enterprise by abusing the organizational form and other arrangements without any reasonable business purpose so as to avoid the enterprise income tax duty . . . [the
tax authority can] deny the existence of the offshore holding company used for tax arrangement.111

However, neither Circular 698 nor any other subsequent regulations
provide a more comprehensive definition of the principle or any guidance
as to how to interpret or apply the term “without any reasonable business
purpose” or “avoid the enterprise income tax duty.” Article 5 of Circular
698 merely lists the materials the tax authority requires from the transacting
parties in order to examine when the equity is transferred indirectly but says
nothing about the criteria the tax authority may apply to determine these
terms. In this sense, Circular 698 creates a brand new veil-piercing regime
separate from the existing regime codified in the Company Law. Technically, this is a much more rigid and broader regime in that it sets out a new and
ambiguous economic substance criterion. Chinese tax authorities, in applying Circular 698’s test of “reasonable business purposes,” may typically

110
Aggressive accounting and earnings management may be legal but indicate that the companies
are in trouble. The companies can make some money by adopting aggressive forensic accounting practices. Now the use of forensic accounting is in a more diversified fashion. The recent years have witnessed a move from traditional indexing, based on market capitalization, to “fundamental” indexing,
based on factors such as revenues, profits or dividends. Other strategies include shifts in operating items
such as research and development spending and taxes, and share buybacks.
111
Circular 698, supra note 4, art. 6.
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evaluate the level of economic substance offshore holding companies have
by reviewing such elements as staff, business premises and operating assets
of individual offshore companies in comparison with the amount of income
realized. This new criterion constitutes a very strong normative movement
in which using a corporate form to perform a tax liability reduction function, even with the presence of other corporate purposes, would result in
veil-piercing. This piercing is less about the function of the subsidiary but
more about the parent’s purpose in reducing tax liability. This notion of
“genuine tax purpose” (or “without reasonable business purpose”) does not
capture the circumstances in which the courts conventionally have pierced
the veil in a parent-subsidiary context.
The economic substance criterion has at least three shortcomings.
First, it does not have a decent level of certainty, which may effectively
provide the Chinese tax authority with more discretion to ignore the separate existence of an offshore holding company incorporated for the purpose
of holding equity in a China-incorporated operational company on behalf of
an ultimate shareholder in an offshore jurisdiction. Second, it creates additional burdens to shareholders when they design their transactional models.
They may have to position some assets into a holding company. This criterion for sure will be burdensome to private equity funds which typically do
not have substantive operational presence in the offshore holding companies. Third, additional transaction costs will be imposed on the transacting
parties, which may now have to conduct extra due diligence to ensure the
transactions are legitimate not only under corporate law but also under tax
law. Given numerous significant and substantive uncertainties, transaction
costs will be a great burden to both the local and international business
communities.
With such general provisions, the tax authority has unlimited and imbalanced discretion. Its interpretative space is too broad and even can be
considered as creating new legal principles. In other words, the law enforcer
acts as the legislator. This blurring of lines makes it more difficult to articulate the level of autonomy and the scope of activity in the subsidiary that
would prevent piercing. The modern company law establishes the general
principle that the courts should respect the legal reality that is created upon
incorporation.
In China, there are many difficulties for the plaintiffs in the administrative proceedings, resulting in a very low success rate. Even if the tax authority abuses its discretion and the argument may be viable, it is difficult in
practice for the taxpayers to successfully gain relief through the administrative proceedings. In addition, because China is not a common law jurisdiction, the court is incapable of making law explicitly through precedents.
Even if the court renders a ruling on a similar case, the ruling neither has
universal effects nor any binding force to the administrative law enforcement of the taxation authority. The tax authority can continue to exercise its
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discretion in similar cases irrespective of rulings on similar or identical cases. The above factors cause great uncertainty in the legal environment for
foreign investors in China. By applying Circular 698 and piercing the corporate veil of the offshore holding company, the Chinese tax authority has
created a new business order by extending its extraterritorial jurisdiction to
overseas corporate groups and imposing Chinese tax liability on offshore
commercial transactions. By doing so, the Chinese tax authority has effectively tightened up the regulatory space for the structure of corporate groups
with offshore holding companies.
The initial precise enforcement approach the PRC tax authorities
would take under Circular 698 was unclear. Progressively, it became apparent in a series of high profile cases involving several well-known private
equity investors and others that the Chinese tax authorities relied on Circular 698 to deal with the perceived abusive use of offshore disposal structures.
1. Chongqing Case and Circular 698
In an effort to invest in a joint venture (JV) in China, a parent company in Singapore established a home-based special purpose vehicle (SPV).
The Chongqing tax authority ignored the existence of the SPV to assess
capital gain taxes realized by the parent company, effectively lifting the
corporate veil.112 The parent company used the SPV to acquire a 31.6% interest in the Chinese JV then sold the SPV to a Chinese company for approximately US$10 million causing the local tax authority to investigate the
underlying transaction.113 The Chongqing tax authority determined that the
SPV lacked economic substance because it “had a representative amount of
capital and no business activity” and was “incorporated with the sole purpose of holding a participation in the JV” to benefit from a China-Singapore
Income Tax Treaty.114 Under the rationale of the Chinese tax authority, the
parent company was required to pay the 10% capital gain tax as if the SPV
did not exist.115
2. Xinjiang Case and Circular 698
The Xinjiang tax authority levied a capital gain tax against a US group
that utilized a SPV in Barbados to invest in a Chinese JV.116 The US group

112

Patricia Lampreave, Anti-Tax Avoidance Measures in China and India: An Evaluation of Specific
Court Decisions, BULL. INT’L.TAX’N. at 49, 53 (2013).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 54.
116
Id.
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was attempting to utilize a tax treaty between China and Barbados that
awards the seller’s resident state sole taxing authority with regard to capital
gains. The SPV paid US$33.8 million for 33.32% equity in the JV located
in Xinjiang and operated with a Chinese oil and gas extraction company. A
year later, the SPV sold back its shares in the JV to the original owner for a
gain of US$12.1 million.117
The local tax authority conducted an audit and determined that “the
transaction was fictitious and had been undertaken with the sole purpose of
avoiding tax.”118 The authority determined that the tax treaty did not apply,
citing a provision under which a business is a resident of the United States
if managed there. 119 The SPV was owned and managed from the United
States and was therefore determined not to be a resident of Barbados. Consequently, the tax authority ignored the existence to the SPV and levied a
capital gain tax against the US investment group.
3. Yangzhou Case and Circular 698
Although the Chinese tax authority has not clarified the exact scope of
Circular 698, the way the tax authority applies Circular 698 can be seen
from the Yangzhou case. The partners of the JV, Yangzhou Chengde Steel
Tube Co., Ltd. (Yangzhou Chengde) in Jiangdu, China were Jiangsu
Chengde Steel Tube Co., Ltd. (Jiangsu Chengde) and Carlyle Group (Carlyle), a well-known private equity investor. Carlyle took a 49% stake in
Yangzhou Chengde through a wholly owned subsidiary in Hong Kong (HK
Co.). In early 2009, noting that Carlyle may transfer the equity of Yangzhou
Chengde indirectly through the equity transfer in HK Co., the Jiangdu State
Tax Bureau immediately reported it to the national tax authority. On December 10, 2009, the State Administration of Taxation issued Circular 698.
In January 2010, Carlyle transferred the equity of the HK Co. to Carlyle
Marco Asia Co., Ltd. (Carlyle Marco), a sister company in the same group.
Jiangsu State Tax Bureau held that the HK Co. is a special purpose company without employees, assets or debts, investments and businesses, and then
applied Circular 698 to levy the enterprise income tax in the amount of
Renminbi 173 million on Carlyle.120 The transactional structure in this case
is indicated in Figure 2 below.

117

Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Xuxiang Xu et al., Single Largest Tax on Non-Resident Enterprises’ Indirect Equity Transfer
Income is Filed to Put into The Treasury, China Taxation News (June 9, 2012); Shaoying Chen, Disregard of Corporate Personality and Its Application on Anti-tax-avoidance, 5 THE JURIST 79 (2011).
118

504

1SHEN_WATTERS

-- NEEDS FFC (DO NOT

DELETE)

10/21/2015 7:42 PM

China’s Extraterritorial Veil-Piercing Attempt
35:469 (2015)

Figure 2: Equity Structure in the Yangzhou Case
It seems clear from the above cases that the Chinese tax authority solely focused on a test of whether (i) the offshore holding company has “no
employee, no other assets or debts, no other investments and no other businesses,” and (ii) whether the actual controlling party achieves the effect of
tax avoidance through the use of the offshore holding company. In other
words, the local tax bureaus in some high-profile cases indicated a tendency
of focusing solely on the business substance of the intermediary holding
companies other than their legal form or commercial purposes. Then the
Chinese tax authority, with these elements being satisfied, seeks the additional revenue by ignoring the veil of the offshore holding company and
levying taxes on the actual controlling party.
A mechanical or strict application of this “economic substance” test is
problematic. Even if the offshore holding company has no employee, other
assets or debts, other investments or businesses, which does not necessarily
mean that the company is incorporated without any other reasonable commercial purposes. A holding company may be formed for internal restructuring, (re)investments or financing purposes or the corporate governance
issues discussed above. Incorporating a holding company in a favorable ju-
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risdiction may help the investors gain access to a restrictive market according to WTO agreements or a free trade agreement or provide a more favorable investment protection regime according to a bilateral investment treaty.
From the financing point of view, the formation of an offshore holding
company is an important step in making the domestic company go public
abroad indirectly through the “round-trip investment” model.121 As Robert
W. Hamilton pointed out, the holding company is to “hold most stocks of
another company without any other business,” a function that appears to be
dismissed as a non-legitimate business purpose by the tax authority.122
It appears that the Chinese tax authority’s regulatory technique to apply Circular 698 is a single dimensional approach and is too narrow to be
justified. Circular 698 contains ambitious direct and indirect attempts to
help bring about a fairer distribution of benefits and burdens in the market.
The argument may be made that “doing justice” to the facts can be a relevant factor in piercing the corporate veil here. In common law jurisdictions,
there is no indication that “doing justice” alone would have been sufficient.123 A broader justice-based approach may provide the judiciary (or tax
regulator in the Chinese context) with wider discretion to pierce the corporate veil where it is necessary to achieve justice if justice here is deemed to
include allowing tax authorities to collect more tax or widen the tax base.
However, prioritizations of efficiency and justice in the tax law reform may
amount to nothing less than a manifestation of the role of the state in molding the public interest and the level of the tax burden to be laid on the corporate sector.
The difficulty of enforcing Circular 698 is making a clear distinction
between genuine and sham arrangements. This may depend on some ulterior test of validity such as economic or commercial purpose. In this regard,
Circular 698 is oversimplified leaving taxpayers and tax authorities little
constructive guidance. For example, it is not clear what a potential purchaser should do if he is acquiring equity in an offshore holding company and is
concerned that the vendor may be liable for Chinese tax under Circular 698.
The purchaser may be at risk as the tax authority may adjust its base cost to

121

See generally Shiwei Zhang, OFFSHORE COMPANY LAW: INTRODUCTION, REGULATIONS &
OPERATION (2004).
122
Wenyu Wang, HOLDING COMPANY AND FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LAW 5 (2003).
123
In English law, Cummings LJ indicated in the Court of Appeal case of Re a Company that “in
our view the cases . show that the court will use its powers to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary
to achieve justice irrespective of the legal efficacy of the corporate structure under consideration.” Re a
Company, [1985] 1 B.C.C. 99421 (CA) 99425 (Cumming-Bruce, L.J.) (Eng.); DAVID KERSHAW,
COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 75 (2d ed. 2012). However, the facts in this case
suggest that the case clearly fits within the category of piercing the corporate veil to evade existing obligations. Nevertheless, UK cases have been influential in forming the contemporary Irish position that
“justice” is a basis for piercing the veil. Fyffes plc v. DCC plc, [2005] IEHC 477 (unreported, High
Court, 21 Dec. 2005).
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recoup tax unpaid by the vendor on an onward disposal by the purchaser.124
Circular 698 fails to adopt or define the “no substantial activities” criterion,
which is supposed to be the major ground to allocate the tax base by the tax
authority and the major weapon against tax avoidance by Chinese residents.
Nor does Circular 698 capture the impact of the corporate tax system on
more conventional notions of “vertical equity” and “horizontal equity”.125
The present approach is based on treating affiliates of integrated corporate
groups as separate entities and then ignoring the corporate veil of a separate
entity in the group. Without some workable criteria, Circular 698 has become inordinately complex (in the sense of interpretation and enforcement),
yet largely ineffective. The other defect with Circular 698 is that Chinese
companies or foreign investors with offshore structures may assume a disproportionate share of the overall corporate tax burden. On the other hand,
it is understandable to see Circular 698 only craft some general principles
due to political concerns over tax avoidance and the existence of a large
number of tax avoidance schemes,126 which will be further discussed in the
next section.
An additional layer of complexity in implementing Circular 698 lies in
the fact that the separate legal status of an intermediary company incorporated in another jurisdiction must be disregarded. The strengthening of residence taxation of worldwide income is often criticized as “extraterritorial.”
China’s ability to pierce the veil according to Circular 698 is one way to
exercise the sovereign power of the government in taxing corporate income
worldwide. This ability, however, may be limited by double taxation treaties, which usually create rights for taxpayers under domestic law. Under a
double taxation treaty, the Chinese tax authority (or court) should be more
cautious to rely on a general anti-avoidance principle to override specific
provisions in a tax treaty. Due to its “extraterritorial” effect, the functioning
of anti-intermediary-company rule relies upon cooperation between the tax
authorities in two jurisdictions. Viewed thus, this rule, heavily relying on
the concepts of residence, source and profits, is vulnerable in a world of instantaneous, or at least very rapid, capital movement. The focus of the jurisdictional cooperation is to evaluate whether the intermediary company is
a real business operation and to allow the company concerned to challenge
a denial of benefits which it considers unjustified.127 Cooperation at either
124
This potentially increases transaction costs. The purchaser may insist on having a condition precedent to the closing in the transactional documents to the effect that vendors fulfill the Circular 698 reporting requirements so as to minimize any potential tax liabilities.
125
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 13–16 (2000).
126
Courts in some countries are reluctant to adopt an over expansive approach to interpreting tax
rules for a variety of reasons. One reason is the concern about the constitutional implication of usurping
the role of the legislature or executive. E. Simpson, The Ramsay Principle: A Curious Incident of Judicial Reticence, BRIT. TAX REV. 358, 358–74 (2004).
127
Devising wide anti-abuse principles in tax treaties is a possibility, but it can be costly and time
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the bilateral or multilateral level also requires a widespread change to the
secrecy law in tax havens. Lack of international cooperation greatly exacerbated the difficulties of effective taxation of income from capital, undermining the principles of equity underpinning income taxation to the point of
threatening the legitimacy of national and international tax systems. In
summary, the enforcement of Circular 698 lacks certainty and convenience,
the main features Adam Smith called to be maxims of taxation.128
The enforcement of Circular 698 triggers the need for a deeper discussion and analysis of tax law and its public law nature. The fact that companies rarely operate alone, that most are members of corporate groups, and
that as multinationals they cross national borders, is a practical reason that a
stand-alone approach is insufficient. Instead, a more contextual approach
should be taken. The “optimal tax theory” requires the tax authority to take
into account certain “constraints” it may face when implementing tax rules
so that it can figure out the best way of achieving tax policy objectives.
Corporate tax law regulates “recursive” relations between the private party
and the government.129 Given the cross-border nature of the corporate group
model, the tax authority needs to link corporate tax policy and law to general public law and policy. Certain values must be well recognized in shaping tax policy. For example, efficiency mandates the tax authority to enforce tax codes without hampering economic growth and backing off
foreign investment. The notion of fairness also requires the tax authority to
reflect a politically appropriate tax burden for the corporate sector to bear.
What is apparent in Circular 698 is a concept of fairness that is contentious
and seems to place a greater emphasis on anti-avoidance than on progressivity.
The Chinese tax authority is confronting the paradox that multinational
businesses are likely to increase in importance. It is the fair tax competition
among nations that would allow business to exploit real commercial opportunities. While Circular 698 may remove some distortions in the marketplace, it will not eliminate regulatory failures. Nor is Circular 698 able to
strike a balance between protection of the tax base and efficiency.130 Rather,
consuming. The bilateral approach has fatal flaws that leave many new gaps, differences and variations,
which in turn may create new tax avoidance opportunities. The treaty network has become a cumbersome and inflexible framework because any refinement, improvement or change to the existing model
can be only implemented by renegotiating treaties, and the interactions of treaties with necessary changes in national tax laws. In fact, tax treaties are more often treated by national tax authorities as instruments to attract overseas investment rather than tools for strengthening international tax coordination.
128
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS BOOKS IV-V 418 (A. Skinner ed., 1999).
129
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 416 (2010). There are two kinds of danger in
this relationship. One is allowing the corporate tax rebate to slide into a marketplace mode in the absence of institutional restraints. The other is that the government may promote a sectional (or sectoral)
public interest.
130
The major instruments to forestall the erosion of the corporation tax base are: the transfer pricing
rule, the thin capitalization rule, and the rule to combat the manipulation of capital profits. These rules
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Circular 698 imposes an excess burden of compliance and enforcement.
Although Circular 698 makes an attempt to address gaps in the current regulatory scheme, the attempt lacks clarity and the even-handedness required
of tax structures in developed economies. In order to reconcile these difficulties the next section looks to policies in the United Kingdom and other
jurisdictions in seeking a solution to reconcile the shortcomings of Circular
698.
IV. THE RAMSAY PRINCIPLE: AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO
IMPROVE CIRCULAR 698
The concept of “reasonable business purpose” and the lack of clarity in
Circular 698 create potential problems of uneven application and lack of
notice to foreign enterprises investing into China. Although the result of
Circular 698 is to pierce the corporate veil, the motivation underpinning the
Circular is revenue enhancement. Thus, the Ramsay principle, a long established principle of tax law, may provide a solution.
A. Circular 698 and Ramsay Principle: A Comparative Approach
1. Policies Underlying the Ramsay Principle
In determining the policies underlying the Ramsay principle it is important to examine the two cases that established the principle—Ramsay v.
Inland Revenue Comrs and Inland Revenue Comrs v. Burmah Oil Co.
Ltd.131
Due to the similarity in legal principles, the House of Lord combined
two cases in its Ramsay decision, Ramsay v. IRC and Eilbeck v. Rawling. In
the first case, W.T. Ramsay Ltd. (Ramsay) was a farming company seeking
to reduce its tax obligations. Ramsay experienced a taxable profit and
sought to avoid the tax by offsetting it with an allowable loss. To this end,
Ramsay employed the help of a company that specialized in structuring tax
avoidance schemes in order to provide a financially neutral situation that on
paper would allow for the reduction of tax liability. The approach used in
such schemes is to employ two assets, one which will decrease in value to
allow for a loss while the other will increase in value and be sold in a manner allowing for a non-taxable gain. In this circumstance, the company utilized two loans. The loans had a clause allowing the interest rate in one loan
to be decreased if the other loan was increased the same amount. After exercising the clause, one loan significantly increased in value while the other
are largely clear-cut so that they can be enforced efficiently while the goals of having these rules can
also be met.
131
Inland Revenue Comrs v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. [1982] STC 30 (HL).
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loan decreased to the same extent. The loan that decreased in value was
used as a capital loss deduction to offset Ramsay’s profits and the increase
on the other loan was assumed not taxable under securities law, allowing
for a net tax savings.
In Eilbeck v. Rawling, the taxpayer, Mr. Rawling, attempted to take
advantage of trust rules to avoid tax liability. According to the provisions,
interests in a trust that can be bought and sold are subject to capital gains
tax, but other interests are not subject to the same taxation. Therefore, Mr.
Rawling created two trusts, one of a type where a reversionary interest in
the trust would be taxable and one where it would not.132 He then transferred assets between the trusts so as to create a loss in taxable assets and a
gain in nontaxable.
In addressing Ramsay and Rawling, Lord Wilberforce stated:
In each case two assets appear, like “particles” in a gas chamber with
opposite charges, one of which is used to create the loss, the other of
which gives rise to an equivalent gain that prevents the taxpayer
from supporting any real loss and whose gain is intended not to be
taxable. Like the particles, these assets have a very short life. Having
served their purpose they cancel each other out and disappear. At the
end of the series of operations, the taxpayer’s financial position is
precisely as it was at the beginning, except that he has paid a fee, and
certain expenses, to the promoter of the scheme.133

These two cases mark a significant change in tax policy and established the beginnings of the Ramsay doctrine by requiring a legitimate purpose other than tax evasion. The facts of both cases represent extreme examples of avoiding tax obligations allowing for easier application of the
doctrine than most real-world situations. Regardless of the ease of application, Ramsay and Rawling represent a change from the previous tax enforcement regime towards requiring a purpose other than avoiding tax liability.
In an expansion and application of the Ramsay principle, the House of
Lords addressed the case of IRC v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. Burmah Oil Group
(Burmah) experienced a loss on the sale of an investment but the loss was
not tax deductible. A series of transactions were created that allowed the
loss to become deductible during the liquidation of one of Burmah’s subsidiaries. The significant difference between Burmah and the aforementioned
cases forming the Ramsay principle is that in Burmah the company used its
own money and transferred assets within its business group, whereas in the
previous cases, money was borrowed and used as part of a pre-packaged

132
133
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scheme.134
In Burmah, the parent company (Burmah) held several subsidiaries including OMDR Holdings Ltd (H), Manchester Oil Refinery Holdings Ltd.
(MORH) and Burmah Oil Trading Ltd (BOTL). H was inactive but held issued share capital of 700,001 GBP through a debt owed by Burmah.
Burmah sold H 50,000,000 GBP of stock in British Petroleum Company
Ltd. (BP) on credit for a purchase price of 380,625,000. H then sold the BP
stock back to Burmah at a loss, leaving the total debt to Burmah at
159,299,999 GBP.
As part of Burmah’s scheme to avoid tax liability, MORH received
funds from Burmah in the amount owed by H and provided the capital to H,
which in turn used the funds to pay off its debt to Burmah. H then doubled
its capital through the creation of 700,001 new ordinary shares par valued at
1 GBP per share. These shares were subsequently sold to Burmah and
BOTL for 159,600,000 GBP and 228 GBP respectively – with BOTL receiving one share and Burmah obtaining the remaining balance. H repaid
the loan to MORH and retained a cash balance of 296,728 GBP which was
later distributed to Burmah and BOTL. Burmah claimed the amount paid
for the new stock as a deduction, further asserting it was allowable through
a tax provision allowing reorganization. This argument, technically complying with the letter of the law, was initially upheld by the special commissioner and the trial court. However, the House of Lords recognized the
structure as a scheme lacking any purpose besides avoiding tax liability and
overturned the decisions of the lower court and special commissioner. In
doing so, it expanded the scope of the Ramsay principle to situations where
the taxpayer uses its own recourses to structure a tax avoidance scheme.
These cases established the modern Ramsay Principle where the court
looks to the substance of a transaction to determine whether an actual loss
has taken place. The doctrine focuses on substantial compliance with the
intent of the law rather than technical adherence. The principle is described
in Burmah Oil by Lord Diplock as follows:
It would be disingenuous to suggest, and dangerous on the part of
those who advise on elaborate tax-avoidance schemes to assume, that
Ramsay’s case did not mark a significant change in the approach
adopted by this House in its judicial role to a pre-ordained series of
transaction (whether or not they include the achievement of a legitimate commercial end) into which there are inserted steps that have
no commercial purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax
which in the absence of those particular steps would have been payable.135

134
135

See id. at 30.
Id.
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As stated above, the Ramsay principle applies when (i) the taxpayer
has designed a series of transactions in advance, and (ii) the transactional
arrangement has no other commercial purposes apart from the avoidance of
tax; then the tax consequence of the arranged transactions should be based
on the economic substance of the entire transaction rather than the legal
form of the various steps—the second point being another way of describing the norm of “no substantial activities,” similar to the “reasonable commercial purpose” test described in Circular 698.
2. The Aftermath of the Ramsay Principle
UK courts have recently shown a more aggressive approach to piercing the corporate veil. In the latest landmark case, the Supreme Court ruled
that company assets held by a spouse can be handed over as part of settlement claims. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected Michael Prest’s claim
that he could not hand over properties controlled by his company to his
former wife as part of a £17.5 million divorce settlement because he was
tens of millions of pounds in debt. Michael Prest is the founder and controller of the Nigerian energy group of Petrodel Resources, incorporated in the
Isle of Man. The Supreme Court ruled that the properties, put behind a corporate structure with a holding company incorporated in an offshore tax haven, were actually held in trust for the husband. Lord Justice Sumption concluded that Michael Prest had “deliberately sought to conceal [that the
properties were held for him] in his evidence and failed to comply with
court orders with particular regard to disclosing evidence . . . The court inferred that the reason for the companies’ failure to cooperate was to protect
the properties, which suggested that proper disclosure would reveal them to
[be] beneficially owned by the husband.” The significance of this verdict
lies in the fact it is against the commonly held view that a company is a
completely separate legal identity and should not be involved in matrimonial proceedings. This landmark case again demonstrated the vulnerability of
the corporate veil in tax evasion cases.136
B. Circular 698 and the Ramsay Principle
Since “no employee, no other assets or debts, no other investments and
no other businesses” can be used as the sole criterion to test the requirement
of “having no reasonable commercial purposes,” what standard should the
tax authority adopt while enforcing Circular 698? The Ramsay principle
may be a useful approach in understanding and addressing these difficulties.
In the 1930s, the House of Lords determined that every citizen has the

136
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right and freedom of tax planning.137 For the tax arrangements made by citizens, it is necessary to examine their legal form rather than substance of the
arrangement. However, since the 1970s, tax avoidance arrangements were
adopted more often in various types of transactions. As mentioned above, in
order to strike a balance between the interest of maintaining and protecting
state tax revenue and the interest of taxpayers, in the Ramsay case 138 in
1982, the English court changed its position from Duke of Westminster and
established the Ramsay principle: (i) if the taxpayer has designed a series of
transactions in advance, and (ii) the transactional arrangement has no other
commercial purposes apart from the avoidance of tax; then the tax consequence of the transaction arrangement should be based on the economic
substance of the entire transaction rather than the legal forms of various
steps. In the Dawson case139 in 1984, the court further consolidated the application of the Ramsay principle and in the case of Craven, v White140 in
1988, the court gave some limitations on the Ramsay principle. In this case,
the House of Lords pointed out that the application of the Ramsay principle
must meet two points: (i) the taxpayer’s insertion must be regarded as an
intermediary step in the tax arrangement by the tax authority, there is no
possibility that the pre-planned series of transactions did not occur in accordance with the plan, otherwise the insertion step may be considered to
have its independence and the entire transaction could not be looked at as a
whole; (ii) the intermediate step of insertion has no other purpose apart
from reducing the tax burden.
C. Vodafone Case in India
In early 2012, the Supreme Court of India heard the Vodafone case.141
Relevant to the discussion here, the court refused to apply the Ramsay principle to the case where the foreign investor indirectly transferred the resident enterprise’s equity through an offshore holding company.142
The facts of the case are very similar to the scenario Circular 698 tries
to cover and regulate. In 1992, the Hutchinson Group acquired the equity of
HEL, an Indian telecoms company. The holding structure was as follows:
137

IRC v. Duke of Westminster [1935] All ER 259 (HL).
W T Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] AC 300 (HL).
139
Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson [1984] 1 AC 474 (HL).
140
Craven v. White [1989] AC 398 (HL)
141
Vodafone Int’l Holdings BV v. Union of India & Anr [SLP (C) No 26529 of 2010, dated 20 January 2012] (India).
142
The Vodafone tax dispute continues in spite of the Supreme Court’s decision. The government
plans to implement retrospective tax laws affecting overseas transactions involving assets in India. The
country’s finance minister said India will settle the Vodafone dispute prior to amending the law. See
Prasanta Sahu et al., India Won’t Amend Tax Law Until Vodafone Issue Settled, WALL ST. J. (March 4,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324178904578340154190197628.html.
138
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the holding company HTIL, incorporated in the Cayman Islands, held the
equity of the holding company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands;
HTI also held the equity of the holding company CGP in the Cayman Islands; CGP held a total of 67% of the equity of HEL through eight companies in Mauritius; the remaining 33% of the shares of HEL were held by the
Essar Company. In 2007, the Dutch company Vodafone NL entered into an
equity transfer agreement with HTI which transferred all its shares of CGP
to Vodafone NL. By this way, Vodafone NL indirectly held 67% of the equity in HEL.143 The transactional structure is indicated in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: The Equity Deal in the Vodafone Case
Tax law in India is quite similar to that in China: the proceeds generated from transferring equity of an Indian company through an offshore company should be taxable. However, if an offshore company transfers equity
of another offshore company, the proceeds are not taxable.144 The difference between Indian and Chinese tax law is that the Indian tax law imposes
withholding liability on the acquirer of equity.
In the case of Vodafone, the Indian tax authority held that the actual
transfer between HTI and Vodafone comprised the equity of an Indian
company, that is, HEL, resulting in Indian tax liability and obligating Vodafone NL to withhold tax. Vodafone NL argued that the transfer between
HTI and itself was the equity of CGP rather than HEL’s and it was under no
143
Vodafone Int’l Holdings BV v. Union of India & Anr [SLP (C) No 26529 of 2010, dated 20 January 2012] 1–29 (India).
144
Id. at 42–43.
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obligation to withhold Indian tax. The key point in this debate was whether
the court or the tax authority could ignore the corporate veil of CGP and
eight holding companies incorporated in Mauritius so as to deem the transaction as between HTI and Vodafone NL.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court first reaffirmed the basic principle: the
parent company and subsidiaries have their own independent legal personalities and cannot be confused.145 The Supreme Court nevertheless would
not allow tax avoidance by the (ab)use of the corporate form. When the
company is only a façade hiding the facts, the court would lift its veil.146
The court reviewed the cases of Duke of Westminster, Ramsay, Dawson and
Craven v White and concluded that the long-term strategic tax planning was
allowed under the Ramsay principle,147 and the establishment of the genuine
corporate structure for reasonable business purposes was protected by the
law.148
There may be many reasonable commercial purposes behind the establishment of a multi-layered corporate structure, such as avoiding business
and political risks, ensuring liquidity of investments, improving borrowing
capacity and avoiding double taxation in international investments.149 The
Supreme Court held that when determining whether the establishment of a
corporate structure had a reasonable commercial purpose, its existence period was a very important factor. 150 It found that the holding structure of
HEL, the equity of which was owned by the Hutchinson Group through
CGP and eight companies in Mauritius, existed for over 10 years, making it
difficult to ignore other commercial purposes apart from tax avoidance.151
This seemed to suggest that a longer period of incorporation may prove the
absence of “avoiding an existing legal obligation,” which has been heavily
adjudicated in veil-piercing cases. In other words, the longer the company
has been put in place, the more difficult to challenge that the company is
incorporated to avoid existing legal obligations. The period of time the
company has been incorporated becomes a testing ground to show the company is incorporated to avoid future legal obligations.
The Vodafone case is also important because it clearly takes into account two key conditions addressing two aspects of the Ramsey principle,
and one of them is the period of time for which the holding structure is in
existence. This will be a useful indicator when the Chinese tax authority
applies Circular 698. Condition (i) requires that when establishing an offshore holding company, the foreign investor should have a plan to indirect145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 35–36, 144–145.
Id. at148.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 51–52.
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ly transfer equity of the Chinese resident enterprise and the plan must be
implemented. If the time when the holding structure is put in place is earlier
than the time of equity transfer, the period between creating of the holding
structure and equity transfer will have many uncertain factors. For example,
due to poor performance or heavy debts of the Chinese resident enterprise,
it is possible that the foreign investor may not execute the transaction in order to exit from the investment. Condition (ii) requires that the new offshore
holding company have no other purposes except tax avoidance. If the offshore holding company is formed after two parties have reached an agreement for the equity transfer, it is obvious that the foreign investor may intend to avoid its tax liability by relying upon this offshore structure.
However, the pre-establishment of the holding company may imply an alternative business purpose unrelated to avoiding tax liability.
It is worth noting that avoiding tax liability through the use of a company may trigger a Ramsay principle (also known as the “reasonable business purpose” principle). The principle is not derived from avoiding existing legal obligations in the veil-piercing cases but shares the similarity with
the rule of avoiding existing legal obligations. The Ramsay principle constitutes a special doctrine of avoiding existing legal obligations and may offer
some insights to the rationality of Circular 698 and offer possible improvements.152
By reference to the Ramsay principle, Circular 698 may be read as follows: the taxpayer, Company A’s tax arrangement is to set up Company B
in BVI and to take advantage of this company to reduce the tax burden.
When (i) the foreign investor establishes the offshore holding company and
this offshore holding company holds the equity of the Chinese resident enterprise, the foreign investor can transfer the equity of the Chinese resident
enterprise indirectly through transferring the equity of the offshore holding
company according to the plan; and (ii) when the establishment of the offshore holding company holding the equity of the Chinese resident enterprise has no other commercial purposes apart from reducing the tax burden,
the tax consequence of indirectly transferring the equity in the Chinese resident enterprise by the foreign investor should be based on the economic
substance of the entire transaction. Then, the tax authority can ignore the
veil of the offshore holding company and Company A’s transfer of equity
in Company B would be equal to Company B’s transfer of equity in Com152
Many judges and scholars regard the Ramsay principle as an interpretation principle of tax law.
Without such general anti-avoidance rules (as Article 47 in PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law) in the UK,
the court then interpreted the objectives of the provisions of tax law through the Ramsay principle,
which to some extent expanded the application of the provisions of tax law and achieved the effect of
anti-tax avoidance. However, since the general anti-avoidance rule has been established in the Enterprise
Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, it is unnecessary to expand the application of the
provisions by teleological interpretation. What can be borrowed from the Ramsay principle for reference
in this article is only the method of determining reasonable business objectives.
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pany C.
As previously demonstrated, the Ramsay principle can be used to remedy the lack of clarity inherent in Circular 698, thereby reconciling the
shortfalls of the regulatory attempt with the reasonable goals of retaining
tax revenue and preventing tax evasion. In adopting the Ramsay principle, it
is important to examine the policy objectives behind the principle to ensure
harmony in combining the two regulatory approaches. To this end, the next
section addresses policy issues connected to the Ramsay principle and Circular 698.
D. The Ramsay Principle and Circular 698: Policy Concerns
The primary policy objective of the Ramsay principle is to prevent
abuse of statutory tax provisions while allowing companies with a legitimate business purpose to structure their transactions in a manner that provides beneficial tax treatment. The tax avoidance structures in the cases establishing the doctrine are extreme examples where the transactions lack
any purpose other than tax avoidance and are mere schemes. However, these schemes are an attempt to comply with the law to receive a benefit not
envisioned by the legislature. This is distinctive from the objectives of veil
piercing, which intends to prevent fraudulent activity.
The Ramsay principle and Circular 698 appear at first glance to have
similar policy objectives; however, Circular 698 is more far reaching. Circular 698 attempts to eliminate tax obstacles by moving away from the tax
treaty principle 153 of jurisdictional allocation towards a system based on
consolidated accounts.154 The consequence of this “unitary” approach is not
only to retain national taxation and even national tax rates but also to create
a de facto single market effect. The application of national taxes to income
generated from international (offshore) business transactions naturally raises issues of the scope of national taxation and possibilities for international
coordination or competition.155 According to Circular 698 (in which tax ju153
The tax treaty approach is labeled as a “flowed miracle.” It preserves to the maximum extent of
the freedom of each state to define its own income tax system while building up sufficient coordination
to facilitate economic flows between states. To achieve these dual tasks, the tax treaty approach tries to
reconcile the conflicting principles of taxation based on source and residence. The real effect of the tax
treaty approach is minimal, and indeed has reinforced the primacy of national jurisdiction. The reason
for this flaw is that the treaty principles for allocation of rights to tax between residence and source
states are essentially designed for portfolio investment. R. S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International
Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301–59 (1996).
154
The current international tax treaty system is based on a so-called “arm’s length” doctrine, which
places an emphasis on taxation of the components of subsidiaries and branches of multinational companies on the basis of separate national accounts, treating each component as if it were an independent
business.
155
The unitary approach requires no commitment from a national government to an overarching
multilateral framework; nor any bilateral or multilateral principles or framework for allocating the tax
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risdiction is not territorially based), income tax may produce overlapping
jurisdictional claims. Put differently, Chinese tax law and principle may be
applied both to persons within the territory and to income earned within the
territory paid to a person outside it. The efforts made in Circular 698 may
raise complaints of “double taxation” and may easily attract an inevitable
negative response from the business community and foreign jurisdictions
which have stridently opposed any move to tax harmonization. The reinforcing of the national basis of income taxation runs counter to the international-integrationist economic logic of cross-border transactions.
As with the Ramsay principle, Article 6 of Circular 698 requires the
transaction to be “without any reasonable business purpose.” This makes
application of Circular 698 only appropriate when tax avoidance is the sole
objective for utilizing an offshore holding company to invest in a domestic
Chinese enterprise. In reality, many advantages exist for structuring ownership though a foreign holding company including the necessary reduction of
formalities when changing foreign ownership in a domestic enterprise. The
reduction of formalities facilitates the free transfer of shares and encourages
investment—a legitimate business objective that is a key policy behind the
corporate form.
The general principles of tax policy are to encourage work, savings
and investment. A tax system should be well designed to maintain and promote fairness. Here, Circular 698 appears to meet the objectives of the Chinese government in terms of tightening the regulatory regime for “roundtripping investments” (discussed in detail in section 5). However, the rules
in Circular 698 may generate undesirable side effects. For instance, enforcement of Circular 698 may increase taxpayers’ compliance costs, generate unfair and greater burdens and create potential implications for China’s international competitiveness. The government’s role in formulating
and reforming tax policy is not only to support but to positively enhance
markets in the public interest. 156 Therefore, China’s corporate tax reform
should follow some basic principles such as avoiding complexity, promoting fairness across corporate tax payers, making adaptive changes based on
business conditions, maintaining stability and lowering tax rates while
maintaining the tax base, thereby creating the best possible location for investment—all of which may reshape China’s economic growth. The ideas
underlying these elements have been adopted by some advanced economies

base of internationally operating business. In this sense of legal effect of enforcing the principle, the
unitary approach is largely similar to the tax treaty approach. This is different from the universal rule
under which profits made outside a country may be included in the taxable profits of business operations
based in that country. According to Circular 698, the profits generated from the sale of equity are not the
income generated from the same country.
156
OECD, TAXING PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 8
(Paris: OECD 1991).
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already.157 The emphasis on the modern business environment in formulating tax policy reflects the reality that businesses, not government, are best
placed to judge how to operate and structure themselves.
The previous sections addressed Circular 698, its legitimacy and creation of a new veil-piercing doctrine through the lens of Chinese and comparative law, with this section proposing a solution borrowed from British
law. Next, the article turns to a global view of the situations underpinning
the need for Circular 698. First, the section addresses the “round-trip investment” model, which provides an explanation for the common convention of using offshore holding companies to invest in China—even by Chinese nationals. This phenomenon, not necessarily specific to China, created
an explicit need for regulatory intervention similar to Circular 698 to prevent the loss of tax revenue. The remainder of the section discusses the
global trend to tighten tax loopholes and “crack down” on tax evasion. Both
domestic and international dimensions draw us a full picture so that we may
better understand the “rationale” of Circular 698.
V. A NEW GLOBAL TAX ORDER? – “RATIONALIZING”
CIRCULAR 698 FROM AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
Although the legitimacy of Circular 698 is doubtful from the company
law perspective, the underlying rationale of Circular 698 is anti-tax avoidance.158 With this in mind, Circular 698 may further enrich the theory and
practice of the veil-lifting doctrine under Chinese laws. As Schumpeter put
it long ago, “Taxes not only helped to create the state. They helped to form
it”.159 This reminds us of the orthodox relationship between taxation and a
system of public finance and macroeconomic management, which leads to a
less transparent, but no less real, functional interchangeability between
taxation and regulation.160 In terms of the insights of political economy, the
economics of corporate tax can never be divorced from politics,161 which is
evidenced by the fact that almost all the most important corporate tax issues
are eminently political. Relevant to our discussion here, Circular 698 is part

157

See generally HM TREASURY & INLAND REVENUE, LARGE BUSINESS TAXATION: THE
GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGY; HM TREASURY & INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE TAX REFORMS: A
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (July 2001); HM TREASURY & INLAND REVENUE, REFORM OF
CORPORATION TAX: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2002); HM TREASURY & INLAND REVENUE,
CORPORATION TAX REFORM: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2003).
158
Shaoying Chen, Disregard of Corporate Personality and Its Application on Anti-tax-avoidance,
5 THE JURIST 78, 78–86 (2011).
159
J.A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM
108 (R. Swedberg ed., 1918).
160
Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice between Regulation and Taxation 2–3 (1999).
161
Peter Riddell, Commentary, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 1304 (Stuart Adam et al., eds., 2010).
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of a regulatory framework, targeting some grey transactions for macroeconomic purposes. This section tries to develop an “explanatory framework,”
with a view of revealing the underlying rationale of Circular 698 in a larger
regulatory context.
A. Round-Trip Investment Model
Recent years have witnessed the popularity of the “round-trip investment” model—a restructuring process offering tax and regulatory benefits
to Chinese investors and companies. An offshore holding company is incorporated in a “satellite” common law jurisdiction, typically in Hong
Kong, the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands or Bermuda. The offshore
holding company, owned or controlled by Chinese shareholders, controls
the onshore operating company either through direct acquisition or contractual arrangement. If through direct acquisition, the offshore holding company acquires and owns the equity capital in the onshore operating company,
which retains ownership and operates existing business assets. Thus, the
Chinese shareholders of the onshore operating company are moved up to
the offshore level.
This is called a “round-trip investment” model for several reasons. The
model involves the transfer of equity—or assets—of Chinese residents being routed to another jurisdiction, typically a tax haven.162 Next, the equity
is re-invested back to the parent company in China through an offshore
holding company. Lastly, the ownership or control of the parent company

162
There has been an international campaign since the financial crisis against tax havens and the
aggressive use of tax havens for tax evasion and avoidance purposes. Britain clinched a deal with its
major offshore tax havens (including Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Anguilla, Montserrat, Turks, the Caicos Islands, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man) on June 15,
2013 by reaching a protocol on information sharing. Under the protocol, records can be opened up to
serve the public interest (i.e., checking who could be making use of tax havens to skirt home-country
taxes). The G8 wants to work out a pact on sharing banking data to allow countries to fight tax evasion.
See London Clinches Deal on Tax Havens, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 16, 2013),
http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1261822/britain-clinches-deal-tax-havens. Tax is a key reason
to tackle this at a global level. However, the positions vary from one government to the other. For example, the UK is pushing the G8 to give political backing to new global standards on corporate tax, including the automatic exchange of tax information and some kind of ownership registry for shell companies. The US has also made a strong commitment to tackle criminal and illicit actors who use shell
companies to hide their true identity. Canada, however, is resisting—partly on grounds of tax confidentiality—plans to crack down on aggressive tax avoidance and evasion by requiring the disclosure of the
ultimate owners of shell companies. See George Parker et al, Hopes for G8 Trade and Tax Deals Dented, FIN. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/42f678fa-d445-11e2-a46400144feab7de.html. The German chancellor also expressed a reluctance to address the issue by saying
that “the generation of profits and tax payment [has] to be linked in individual countries.” James
Fontanella-Khan & Jamie Smyth, Ireland Pledges Cooperation on Global Tax Avoidance Plan, FIN.
TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1accd5b2-c2d5-11e2-9bcb-00144feab7de.html.
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remains with the Chinese shareholders.163 Figure 4 below demonstrates the
corporate structure of the onshore operating company after the completion
of the re-structuring process, but before the foreign investment is made into
the holding company.

Figure 4: “Round-trip Investment” Model
The “round-trip investment” model reflects the local business community’s preference to be “packaged” as foreign investment,164 and the concern, among others, that the government may impose exchange restrictions
on residents,165 even though the Chinese government has gradually relaxed
foreign exchange quotas for outbound investment since 2006.166
The “round-trip investment” model lends economic and regulatory
benefits to Chinese companies and resident shareholders. First, the idea of
tax avoidance and tax-differential treatment between local and foreign investors is the main driver of the “round-trip investment” model. Until recently, the playing field was tilted in favor of foreign-invested enterprises
The “round-tripping” investment also appears in other jurisdictions, and is a highly litigated or
arbitrated issue. See Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction
(April 29, 2004).
164
Terry Sicular, Capital Flight and Foreign Investment: Two Tales from China and Russia, 21
WORLD ECON. 589, 589–602 (1998).
165
Frank R. Gunter, Capital Flight from the People’s Republic of China: 1984-94 7(1) CHINA
ECON. REV. 77–96 (1996).
166
Wei Shen, Is SAFE Safe Now? – Foreign Exchange Regulatory Control over Chinese Outbound
and Inbound Investments and a Political Economy Analysis of Policies 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 227,
229–36 (2010); Wei Shen, Globalisation of Renminbi and Renminbi Settlement in Cross-border Investment, Trade and Fundraising Businesses: Rules, Operations and Problems 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 553,
563 (2013).
163
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(FIEs). Prior to the promulgation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law,167 the
income tax rate for an FIE was 15–25%, while a tax rate of 33% is applicable to a pure domestic entity. 168 By adopting a “round-trip investment”
model, Chinese companies and residents may capture a tax break and enjoy
more preferential tax treatment. In other words, the same business will be
subject to a much lower tax rate.
Even after the enactment of the Enterprise Income Tax Law, under
which both FIEs and purely Chinese enterprises are subject to the same enterprise income tax rate of 25%, the “round-trip investment” model still enables shareholders to enjoy more preferential tax treatment. By utilizing the
“round-trip investment” model, the offshore holding company is only subject to a withholding tax on the distribution of dividends from the PRCbased operating company. The withholding tax rate is 10% depending on
the application of a tax treaty and can be as low as 5% if the offshore company is incorporated in Hong Kong.169 Any payments of interest or dividends made by the offshore holding company, and/or capital gains derived
from exiting the investment through the sale of shares in the offshore holding company, are free of PRC tax. By contrast, sales proceeds in a share
transfer for a purely domestic company in China are deemed to be taxable
income. Together with other taxable income received in the same fiscal year
the proceeds are subject to a 25% enterprise income tax after the allowable
deductions.
The tax evasion theory is another explanation for the pattern of
“round-tripping.”170 China uses export tax rebates to entice domestic firms
to export more.171 Exports from China to Hong Kong and other jurisdic167
The PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted on March 16, 2007 and came into effect on
January 1, 2008.
168
In addition to a lower tax rate, China also offered a “2-year exemption and 3-year half reduction”
package to FIEs. Accordingly, an FIE is exempt from the corporate income tax in the first two years of
making profits and only needs to pay 50% of corporate income tax in the following three years. Unless
grandfathered, FIEs are no longer entitled to such preferential tax treatment under the new PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law. FIEs located in national high-tech industrial zones were entitled to a 15% preferential tax rate.
169
See Wei Shen, Deconstructing the Myth of Alipay Drama – Re-Politicizing Foreign Investment in
the Telecommunications Sector in China, 36 TELECOM. POL’Y 929, 929–32 ( 2012).
170
See generally, Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972); Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View
58 NAT’L TAX J. 643 (2005).
171
The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides rules for the use of
government subsidies and the application of remedies to address subsidized trade that has harmful commercial effects. A subsidy has a very particular meaning under the WTO rules (and Title VII of the US
Tariff Act of 1930), and is defined as a “financial contribution” by a government which provides a benefit, and may include foregone government revenue (e.g., a tax credit). A subsidy granted by a WTO
member government is prohibited if it is contingent, in law or in fact, on export performance, or on the
use of domestic over imported goods. These prohibited subsidies are commonly referred to as export
subsidies and import substitution subsidies, respectively. The export rebate tax, allowing for refunds,
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tions, however, are systematically under-reported. This is largely because of
the capital account control, which induces Chinese firms to place and control a chunk of export earnings in an offshore jurisdiction so that further
currency conversion restrictions can be avoided. These exporting firms prefer to trade off the benefits of tax breaks on “round-tripping” investment
against the loss of export rebates if they under report the export figure. On
the import side, an importing firm, after evaluating the trade-offs of the
benefits of tax breaks on “round-tripping” investments against the cost of
import tariffs if it over-reports the imports figure, has a tendency to underreport imports and to mislabel more highly taxable imported goods to lower-taxed ones so as to evade import tariffs.172 Based on the tax evasion theory, in order to capture the tax differential, a portion of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China is thus attributable to the under-reported amount of
export earnings or over-reported imports.
This also matches the empirical finding that the reported exports from
China to Hong Kong are consistently lower than those Hong Kong reports,
but the Chinese imports are greater than the numbers Hong Kong reports.173
Over-invoicing for exports from mainland China to Hong Kong has operated as an important channel guiding these financial flows into China. It is
natural to see that exports to Hong Kong have surged to the highest level
since 1995. The Chinese government has been trying to bring the overinvoicing under control. New banking rules in China also stipulate a reduction in the ratio of foreign currency loans to foreign currency deposits. Domestic banks are likely to buy US dollars in order to satisfy these rules. The
risk is that inflows turn quickly to outflows given the fact the US dollar is to
strengthen against other major currencies, which could contribute to a liquidity crisis in China’s fragile shadow banking system. Economists at
Global Financial Integrity, an American research group that campaigns
against illicit financial flows, have spotted huge discrepancies between (i)
China’s reported exports to the world and the world’s stated imports from
China; and (ii) China’s purchases from the world and the world’s exports to
China. This rampant mis-invoicing indicates that China may have understated its exports and overstated its imports by a combined US$430 billion

reductions, or exemptions from taxes and other payments owed to the Chinese government, available to
exporters, is treated as an unfair subsidy program by China’s major trading partners. The US has repeatedly raised its concerns about these subsidies and once brought a dispute in the WTO against China
though the dispute was resolved at the consultation stage. See Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/asset_
upload_file847_6464.pdf (last visited May 11, 2012).
172
Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from “Missing Imports” in China, 112 J. POL. ECON. 471, 473 (2004).
173
World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution database and the United Nations’ Comtrade database.
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in 2011.174 These discrepancies at least confirm the difficulty of curbing the
cross-border flow of capital in China, a country with such a heavy crossborder flow of goods.
For the purposes of piercing the corporate veil, it is important to differentiate between using the “round-trip investment” model as a method of
avoiding complex and costly regulation and taking advantage of tax incentives and acts of fraud committed by some investors while using the investment model. The intentional improper reporting of imports and exports
to avoid payment of customs duties constitutes fraud. However, merely employing the “round-trip investment” model to take advantage of the legal
framework, whether or not permissible under tax law, does not rise to the
level of fraud and is not a legitimate basis for piercing the corporate veil.
The “round-trip investment” model is also often used to facilitate attracting FDI into onshore operating companies through an offshore holding
company. Instead of directly acquiring the equity capital in a Chinaincorporated company, foreign investors prefer to acquire the equity capital
in an offshore holding company. In doing so, both Chinese shareholders and
foreign investors can avoid the rigid regulatory regime in China. For example, if a foreign investor directly invests into a Chinese company and becomes a shareholder afterwards, any amendments to the articles of association of the company, transfer of equity capital, increase and reduction of the
equity capital and liquidation and dissolution of the company are subject to
unanimous consent of all the shareholders and approval of the original approval authority—a truly painful and time-consuming process. Exiting
through a sale of the equity in a company will also trigger approval from
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) or its local branch. 175 Moreover,
under the Equity Joint Venture Regulations other shareholders have a preemptive right to acquire the equity of the selling shareholder and have the
absolute consent right to any general transfer. No transfer of an interest in
the equity joint venture (EJV) or contractual joint venture (CJV)—including
transfers of interests between the joint venture shareholders—can be made
without an amendment to the articles of association, the other parties’ consent, unanimous consent of the board and approval of the original approval
authority.176 The transfer of shares at the onshore level, therefore, may result in a deadlock between Chinese and foreign shareholders. In the “roundtrip investment” model, however, the amendments to the articles of association of the offshore holding company, transfer of equity capital, increase
and reduction of equity capital and liquidation and dissolution of the hold174

The Flight of the Renminbi, ECONOMIST (Oct 27, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/
china/21565277-economic-repression-home-causing-more-chinese-money-vote-its-feet-flight.
175
Wei Shen, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? — Placing (or Misplacing)
Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 561, 569 n.21 (2012).
176
Weimin Zhang & Andy See, Foreign Investment Enterprises in China, 10 INT’L CO. & COM. L.
REV. 255, 258 n.10 (1999).
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ing company do not require unanimous consent of all shareholders or the
approval of any governmental authority. This partially motivates both Chinese and foreign investors to adopt the “round-trip investment” model,
which should be a permissible basis under Circular 698 because seeking to
avoid costs while complying with the law is arguably a legitimate business
purpose.
The “round-trip investment” model is the prevailing market practice
for foreign investors to invest in a Chinese venture. As a forum shopping
strategy, foreign investors land investments into China through offshore vehicles because the offshore regime is more flexible and has higher standards, thus better supports multiple rounds of debt and equity financing. The
“round-trip investment” model, like a “locked-in” market norm, is the result
of efficient bargaining in a series of transactional events.177 The advantages
of this model are the possibility of avoiding the burdensome Chinese corporate law regime and, in spite of the “switching costs,” reducing transaction
costs. This model, as a type of an informal sanction, has “piggy backed” on
more user-friendly offshore jurisdictions in order to facilitate private
placement and future overseas listings in Hong Kong, New York or elsewhere, thereby partially replacing formal legal institutions in China.
Despite it being reasonable to estimate that a portion of FDI into China
is in the form of “round-trip investment,” empirically it is very difficult to
quantify the amount of “round-trip investment.” Take 2008 as an example.
FDI to China amounted to a total of US$92,395 million. A breakdown of
these utilized inbound investments by country of origin indicates that
around 44.41% and 17.27% came from Hong Kong and the British Virgin
Islands respectively, which can be seen in Table 1 below. Foreign investment inflows from Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands are far more
than those from the United States and Japan, which are traditionally treated
as the major investors into China. On the other hand, in the early 1990s
China started outbound FDI activities that became more significant since
2001, as Table 2 indicates below.178 According to official figures, China’s
177
This assumption is largely based on the efficiency theory that lawyers, as transaction-cost engineers, are well-compensated and sophisticated enough to structure the transaction in the most feasible
and efficient way. As a result, transaction costs in negotiating a new transactional structure and changing
the existing equilibrium among the parties may be high in an economic sense. See Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules
99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989).
178
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) first put forward the so-called
“go globally” or “going abroad” strategy in 1998. The strategy was, for the first time, included in the
10th Five-Year Plan in 2001. The Central Committee of the CPC repeated its commitment to implementing this strategy in its Decision on Some Issues concerning the Improvement of the Social Economy Market, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-10/21/content_1135402.htm. Since 2001, China has been steadily promoting overseas direct investment to lessen the external surplus and to secure
access to natural resources. The Chinese government set a clear objective of nurturing up to 50 globally
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outward direct investment exceeded $77 billion in 2012, an increase of
12.6% on the previous year, even as inflows of FDI fell for the first time
since the outbreak of the financial crisis.179 A significant portion of Chinese
outbound FDI does flow to “satellite” jurisdictions (or tax haven regimes).
Table 2 demonstrates statistically that by the end of 2012 many Chinese
companies’ and residents’ outbound investments had been made to offshore
financial centers such as Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British
Virgin Islands, rather than the United States, Japan or Russia. The Heritage
Foundation in Washington DC and the Economist Intelligence Unit
showed, quite differently, that top destinations for China’s outward investment during the period from 2005 to 2012 were Australia, the United
States, Canada, Brazil, Britain, Indonesia, Russia and Kazakhstan.180 Table
3 shows that the share of outbound FDI to Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands
and the British Virgin Islands constitutes two-thirds of the total outbound
investment, and has remained at the same level for the past five years. Bilateral FDI stocks from Hong Kong to China were the second largest (in the
amount of US$241,573 million) against the eighth largest stocks from China to Hong Kong (in the amount of US$164,063) in the world in 2005 and
“round-tripping” FDI accounted for a large share of these flows. 181 The
shares of small economies such as the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, which have risen over the past several years, can account for
some of the “round-tripping” flows.182 As tax havens, incorporation regimes
and offshore financial centers, at least a substantial portion of capital flows
from the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands or Hong Kong can presumably be from “round-tripping.”183 If this analysis holds, a share of onecompetitive “national champions” by 2010. See Usha C. V. Haley, Hearing on China’s World Trade
Compliance: Industrial Subsidies and the Impact on U.S. and World Markets, Statement before the U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, (April 4, 2006), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/transcripts/4.4.06HearingT.pdf (last visited on April 29, 2010).
179
ODI-lay Hee-ho, ECONOMIST, (Jan. 19, 2013).
180
Id.
181
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational
Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, at 44–45, U.N. Sales No. E.07.11.D.9 (2007),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2007_en.pdf.
182
The Cayman Islands is home to more than 9,400 hedge funds, sheltering assets worth an estimated US$2.2 trillion. Thousands of hedge funds are located in the Cayman Islands due to its “tax neutrality.” The Caymans and other offshore tax havens have faced increasing calls from foreign governments
for an overhaul of their tax regulations. On the other hand, the Caymans and other tax havens are also
under pressure from investors on various reform initiatives. For example, a company linked to DMS
Management, the largest provider of hedge fund “fiduciary services”—the hiring of independent directors to sit on fund boards—has filed a suit against the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority in order to
stop the latter from “taking any decision” on a range of transparency and corporate government reforms.
See Sam Jones, Great Tax Race: Hedge Fund Group Sues Over Cayman Reforms, FIN. TIMES, (April 29,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24feef72-adc5-11e2-82b8-00144feabdc0.html.
183
Int’l Monetary Fund Transcript of an Economic Forum, Foreign Direct Investment in China:
What Do We Need To Know? (May 2, 2002) http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2002/tr020502.htm (es-
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third of all inbound investment to China may be from “round-trip” investments.184 Studies of individual countries have estimated that annual capital
flight as high as an average of 10.2% of Chinese GDP.185 Although some of
this amount may be reinvested through “round-tripping,” it entails a massive volume of capital outflows, outstripping in aggregate the inflows of
foreign aid as well as considerable losses of public revenues.
This line of analysis also makes sense in a global context. According
to figures from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Netherlands and Luxembourg booked US$5.8 trillion of
FDI by the end of 2012, which was more than the US, UK and Germany
combined. The Netherlands alone attracted US$3.5 trillion by the end of
2012 with the value of cumulative capital investment of US$3.5 trillion,
while only US$573 billion ended up in “real” Dutch companies. The majority of this total FDI went to SPVs, a sort of tax avoidance instrument. Similarly, Luxembourg booked US$2.28 trillion in FDI but only US$122 billion
entered its real economy.186 The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland are
all viewed as tax havens allowing multinationals such as Starbucks and Apple to cut their tax bill worldwide.187 Tax avoidance has been a global issue
which has severely affected capital flow worldwide. In a global context, US
multinationals disproportionately report profits in the amount of US$768
billion in low tax countries whereas European businesses invested US$768
billion in low or no tax countries in 2010.188 While recent attention has focused on tax havens and individual multinationals, the global debate has also turned its emphasis to developed economies such as Ireland and the
Netherlands which have been seen to suck up corporate investment by helping companies avoid hefty tax bills in their own jurisdictions.

timating that 15% of Hong Kong-originated capital is the round-tripping capital).
184
The World Bank estimated that the “round-trip” investment is at least 25% of China’s total FDI
while others may claim a higher percentage. See respectively, WORLD BANK, Private Capital Flows to
Emerging Markets in GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (World Bank Publication 2002) at 41 (Box 2.3:
Round-tripping of Capital Flows between China and Hong Kong), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTGDF2002/Resources/chapter2.pdf; Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping FDI:
Scale, Causes and Implications 7 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst. Discussion Paper (Tokyo) No. 7 2004),
http://www.adbi.org/files/2004.06.dp7.foreign.direct.investment.people.rep.china.implications.pdf
(claiming that the “round-trip” investment constitutes 30% to 50% of the total FDI); David Dollar &
Aart Kraay, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender: Does China’s Zero Net Foreign Asset Position Make
Economic Sense? 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 943, 950 (2006) (estimating that “round-tripping” represents
as much as one third of China’s FDI).
185
See generally Gerald A. Epstein, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (2005).
186
Vanessa Houlder, Figures Shed Light on Tax Avoidance Haul, FIN. TIMES (April 28, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aad0297e-b020-11e2-8d07-00144feabdc0.html.
187
Alex Barker, EU Steps Up Brussels Broadens Probe into Tax Sweeteners for Multinationals, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b93d4126-b345-11e3-b09d-00144feabdc0.html.
188
Id.
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Table 1: FDI Inflows to China from Major Originating Countries
(by share percentage)189

189

Data from 1994 to 2003 is from the CEIC database and data from 2004 to 2008 is from
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywzfgbdqtj/t20090122_101099.htm. Data for Australia during the period from 2004 to 2008 is not available and is grouped into the “others” category.
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No.

Destinations

1

Hong Kong SAR

2

16.81

20.33

15.06

23.24

29.26

30.85

3

Cayman Islands
British Virgin
Islands

6.63

10.48

16.81

17.26

21.69

30.07

4

United States

1.88

3.36

5.86

7.87

11.04

13.87

5

Australia

1.44

3.34

4.86

6.07

10.6

12.38

6

Singapore

1.44

3.05

3.34

5.79

8.99

17.08

7

Russia

1.42

2.39

2.48

4.88

7.08

8.98

Canada

1.25

1.84

2.31

4.15

4.06

4.78

9

Korea

1.21

1.56

1.84

2.79

3.76

4.89

10

Pakistan

1.07

1.4

1.44

2

3.73

5.05

8

by 2007
68.78

Total Amount (US$ billion)190
by 2008 by 2009 by 2010 by 2011
115.85
164.5
199.06
261.52

by 2012
306.37

Table 2: Top 10 Destinations of China’s Outbound
Investments (2007-2012)191

2003

Percentage of the total outbound investments from 2003 to 2012192
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2012

Hong
Kong

40.24

47.80

27.89

39.30

51.81

61.90

63.00

56.00

61.57

58.40

Cayman
Islands
British
Virgin
Islands

30.38

23.39

42.10

44.41

9.81

2.70

9.50

5.10

5.11

0.90

18.24

7.01

9.99

3.05

7.07

3.80

2.90

8.90

6.89

2.60

Table 3: China’s Outbound Investments to Hong Kong, the
Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands193

190
Ministry of Commerce of PRC, National Bureau of Statistics of PRC and State Administration of
Foreign Exchange, 2012 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 18 (China
Statistics Press, 2013).
191
Data available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20090225_102467.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/lntjsj/jwtzsj/2008yearjwtzsj/t20100107_116741.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20100920_126763.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20110921_137372.htm.
192
See Ministry of Commerce of PRC, 2012 Statistical Bulletin, supra note 190, at 10.
193
Data available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20090225_102471.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/lntjsj/jwtzsj/2008yearjwtzsj/t20100107_116741.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20100920_126763.htm;
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20110921_137372.htm.
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The broad use of the “round-trip investment” model per se has a damaging impact on China’s tax pool, State-owned assets, foreign exchange
control and regulatory efficiency. In addition, the “round-trip investment”
model has been used in money-laundering activities speculating on Renminbi-denominated assets. 194 Essentially, this model is a device used by
Chinese and foreign businesses to exploit both regulatory law and practice,
to resist control, and are typical examples of “creative compliance”
whereby investors play the system through tax and regulatory arbitrage.
This has led to variety to statutory and regulatory attempts to regulate the
“round-trip investment” model.
B. Regulatory Measures to the “Round-trip Investment” Model
Chinese authorities have incrementally been tightening up regulatory
loopholes in the past several years. This section addresses and summarizes
a variety of the measures taken to restrict the loopholes and regulate the
“round-trip investment” model. Relevant regulations are as follows:
1. Foreign Exchange Control Rules in 2005
SAFE issued two sets of rules in January and April 2005 respectively:
the Circular on Relevant Issues in Perfecting Foreign Exchange Control in
Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign Investors (“Circular 11”) and the Circular on Relevant Issues in the Registration of the Offshore Investments of
Individual Domestic Residents and Foreign Exchange Registration in respect of Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign Investors (“Circular 29”).
These two circulars required Chinese residents making an investment in
China through an offshore SPV to carry out approval and registration formalities with SAFE or one of its local equivalents. In particular, these two
circulars required residents to obtain approval from the national-level
SAFE, but failed to provide any procedural guidance to applicants with
which to follow. These two Circulars, therefore, made obtaining approval
from SAFE a mission impossible, and de facto froze PRC investments involving offshore companies controlled by PRC residents, considerably
slowing the flow of PRC-related private and foreign investments into China
and red-chip listings.
The foreign investment community lobbied against both Circular 11
and Circular 29 due to the lack of procedural guidance and regulatory certainty. In October 2005, SAFE issued the Circular on Relevant Issues in the
Foreign Exchange Control with respect to the Financing and Round-trip Investment through Offshore Special Purpose Companies by Residents Inside
194

See Round-trip Investments Key to Reversing FDI Decline, CHINA L. & PRAC. (May 2009),
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/article/2194941.
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China (“Circular 75”) to repeal Circular 11 and Circular 29.195 Under Circular 75, Chinese residents 196 need to register 197 their “round-trip” investments198 with the local SAFE office: (i) before forming or taking control of
a special purpose company199 abroad;200 (ii) when injecting a domestic enterprise’s assets or equity into an SPV;201 (iii) when conducting an equity
financing exercise abroad after injecting assets or equity into an SPV;202 or
(iv) within thirty days of a material change in the capital structure—
including external guarantees—of a SPV controlled by Chinese residents.203
In addition, a domestic resident must go through the approval or registration procedure for the domestic enterprise’s receipt of the “round-trip”
investments or loans from a SPV’s financing proceeds like any other domestic enterprise engaging in similar foreign exchange transactions.204 The
consequence of failing to register the “round-trip” investment with SAFE,
or its local branch, or to comply with other SAFE rules is two-fold. First,
the offshore parent company’s Chinese subsidiary will be prohibited from
distributing “profits, dividends, liquidation proceeds, equity transfer proceeds [and] capital reduction proceeds” out of China,205 and will bear liabil195
Guanyu Jingnei Juming Tongguo Jingwai Teshu Mudi Gongsi Rongzi Ji Fancheng Touzi Waihui
Guanli Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (国家外汇管理局关于境内居民通过境外特殊目的公司融资及返
程投资外汇管理有关问题的通知, 汇发〔2005〕75 号) [Circular on Relevant Issues in the Foreign
Exchange Control with respect to the Financing and Round-trip Investment through Offshore Special
Purpose Companies by Residents Inside China (Circular 75)] (promulgated by the State Administration
on Foreign Exchange (SAFE), Oct. 1, 2005, effective Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Circular 75] (China).
196
According to Section 1 of Circular 75, the term “residents” covers both “domestic resident natural persons” including individuals holding a China domestic identity document and other individuals
who “habitually reside in China for reasons related to their economic interests” and “domestic resident
legal persons” including the enterprises, other economic organizations and the newly recognized “domestic venture investment enterprises.” See id. at § 1
197
Although Circular 75 only requests the domestic residents register the transactions with SAFE,
the information required to be submitted to SAFE is so substantive that registration is the same as approval or verification, where SAFE will conduct a substantive review and exerts its discretion in the registration process. Id. at § 3.
198
The definition of “round-trip investment” under the foreign exchange rules is great in breadth and
detail to “cover purchasing or swapping for the equity of a Chinese shareholder/owner in a domestic
enterprise; establishing a foreign-invested enterprise in China and through such an enterprise purchasing
or reaching agreement to control domestic assets; purchasing through agreement domestic assets and
using such assets to invest in and establish a foreign-invested enterprise or for increasing the capital of a
domestic enterprise.” Id. at §1(2).
199
The definition of a “special purpose company” in Circular 75 is narrow and only covers those
entities “conducting . financing abroad [with] the assets of the domestic enterprise or equity.” Id § 1.
This definition seems to suggest that Circular 75 does not apply to SPVs with cash investment from the
domestic resident or without the purpose of obtaining financing abroad.
200
Id. at § 2.
201
Id. at § 3.
202
Id.
203
Id. at § 7.
204
Id. at § 5.
205
Id. at § 6.
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ity under Chinese law for violation of the relevant foreign exchange rules.
Compared to Circulars 11 and 29, Circular 75 re-opened the door to Chinese residents who are able to make use of offshore SPVs to conduct offshore financings.
SAFE issued the Operating Procedures Regarding Issues Concerning
Foreign Exchange Control on Financing and Round-trip Investment
Through Offshore Special Purpose Companies by Domestic Residents
(“Circular 106”) on May 29, 2007, to clarify Circular 75. Circular 106
works to implement Circular 75 by not only outlining a roadmap of the
documentation and intricate registration requirements for the multiple
stages of SPV financing, but also imposing new compliance burdens on
Chinese residents’ use of SPVs in offshore jurisdictions. Accordingly, a
domestic target company in a “round-trip” investment is required to have a
three-year operating history and the registration requirement is extended to
Chinese residents’ “greenfield” investments. The scope of “Chinese residents” is further expanded to any foreigner who “has permanent residence
in China, owns onshore assets or interest in the Chinese company, or beneficially owns offshore assets or interests converted from his assets in the
Chinese company.”206
2. Mergers and Acquisitions Rules in 2006
The most influential piece of legislation which had an immediate and
widespread effect on the “round-trip investment” model is the Provisions on
the Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“M&A
Rules”) in 2006.207 To restore a higher level of scrutiny and streamline the
approval procedure, the M&A Rules require domestic companies to disclose the offshore shareholding structure to, and obtain approval from,

206
Circular 19 eliminates most of the overlap between SAFE and MOFCOM, and simplifies the
foreign currency registration of “round-trip” investments and fundraising, while increasing the pressure
and urgency on investors to rectify previous non-registration. SAFE’s procedures are conditional upon
the applicants having complied with MOFCOM’s requirements. See Guojie Waihui Guanli Ju Guanyu
Yinfa Jingnei Jumin Tongguo Jingqai Teshu Mudi Gongsi Rongzi Ji Fancheng Touzi Waihui Guanli
Caozou Guicheng de Tongzi (国家外汇管理局关于印发《境内居民通过境外特殊目的公司融资及
返程投资外汇管理操作规程》的通知, 汇发〔2011〕19 号) [Operating Instructions on Foreign Exchange Administration for Domestic Residents Engaging in Financing and Round-tripping Investment
via Overseas Special Purpose Vehicles (Circular 19)] (promulgated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) on May 20, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) [hereinafter Circular 19] (China).
207
The M&A Rules were jointly issued by six ministries including SAFE, SAIC and MOFCOM.
See Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding (关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规
定) [Provisions on the Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by Order No. 10 of the Ministry of Commerce, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and
Commerce, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Administration of Foreign Exchange on
Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006) (amended June 22, 2009) [hereinafter M&A Rules] (China).
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MOFCOM before setting up an offshore SPV. 208 Meanwhile, no trusteeship, holding through agency or other means, is allowed to circumvent these
procedural requirements. 209 After receiving preliminary approval from
MOFCOM, a domestic company is entitled to submit application documents for the initial public offering (IPO) in an overseas stock exchange by
the SPV to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), China’s
securities regulator. Following the CSRC’s approval, the domestic company
is required to apply to MOFCOM for an FIE approval certificate—bearing
the legend “equity held by an overseas SPV”—valid for one year from the
date of issuance of the business license. The domestic company must submit both a report of its overseas IPO through an SPV and the IPO proceeds
repatriation plan to MOFCOM within 30 days following the IPO.210 In addition, the SPV must restore the domestic firm to its initial shareholding composition if the listing does not take place within one year. The M&A Rules
make the entire registration/approval regime more clumsy, burdensome, uncertain, time-consuming and costly. Under the M&A Rules, the VIE structure is, overall, unworkable and the flow of new PE-backed companies and
the route of red-chip listings have been effectively closed off.211 As a matter
of fact, MOFCOM and CSRC have not approved any related transactions
and overseas IPOs since the promulgation of the M&A Rules. Almost all
offshore restructurings of the VIE structure may have to stop.212
3. Tax Notice 82 in 2009
The new PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law (effective as of January 1,
2008) introduced the concept of Tax Resident Enterprise (“TRE”) for the
first time. In early 2009, looking to secure a sensible tax pool, the State
Administration of Taxation issued Notice 82213 to clarify the concept of “es208
An SPV is defined as any overseas company controlled, directly or indirectly, by a domestic
company or Chinese natural person inside China for overseas the listing of share interests. Id. at ch. IV.
209
Id at art. 15.
210
Id. at arts. 45, 47.
211
Article 11 of the M&A Rules provides that, where a foreign company established or controlled
by a domestic company, enterprise or natural person intends to take over its domestic affiliated company, it shall be subject to the examination and approval of MOFCOM. The parties concerned cannot get
around these requirements by making investments within China through a foreign-funded enterprise or
other means. Certainly, this hinges on how liberal MOFCOM will be in approving the VIE structure.
Within the first year of enacting the provisions, there were no approvals for restructurings of Chinese
companies into offshore holding companies.
212
While SAFE increased its focus and coordination through issuing Circular 19, MOFCOM’s uncertainties under the M&A Rules remain.
213
Guoshui fa Guanyu Jingwai Zhuce Zhong Zi Konggu Qiye Yiju Shiji Guanli Jigou Biaoshun
Rending Wei Jumin Quiye Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi Guiding (国税发《关于境外注册中资控股企
业依据实际管理机构标准认定为居民企业有关问题的通知》规定[2009]82 号) [Notice concerning
the Recognition of Chinese-controlled Overseas Incorporated Enterprises as Resident Enterprises ac-
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tablishment” in the “round-trip investment” structure.214 Under the Enterprise Income Tax law, an enterprise that is established outside the PRC but
has its “place of effective management” in the PRC is regarded as a PRC
tax resident enterprise. Notice 82 set out certain proposed interpretative
guidance on what constitutes a place of effective management. Under Notice 82, overseas enterprises that are “controlled” by PRC enterprises may
be deemed as PRC tax residents when certain conditions are satisfied. 215
With the passing of Notice 82, the non-resident status of an offshore SPV in
the “round-trip” investment structure may be difficult to maintain because
the offshore SPV may be regarded as a PRC tax resident under Notice 82.
As an overriding consideration, Notice 82 laid down the “substance-overform” principle as the basis for determination of the place of effective management. Notice 82 is among the PRC tax authority’s primary instruments
in its effort to tighten control over “round-trip” investments, and may push
industrial and PE investors to reconsider the use of the “round-trip investment” model, or utilize other protective strategies in their China-related
deals.216
With the aim of further standardising the tax administration for the
Chinese-capital controlled foreign companies (“CCCFCs”) which obtained
Chinese TRE status (known as overseas registered Chinese-capital controlled tax resident, or “deemed overseas TREs” in short), the State Administration of Taxation released the Administrative Measures for Overseas
Registered Chinese-capital Controlled TREs (Trial) on July 27, 2011. The
Measures, effective from September 1, 2011, cover the major tax matters
concerning deemed overseas TREs including application procedures for obtaining TRE status, documentation requirements, CIT treatments, administration and collection matters and application of double tax treaty provisions.

cording to the Actual Management Entity Standard (Notice 82)] (promulgated by the State Administration of Taxation, effective April 22, 2009) [hereinafter Tax Notice 82].
214
For example, the determination criteria of Chinese TREs for Chinese-capital controlled foreign
companies (“CCCFC”).
215
These conditions include, for example, where senior management are in charge of day-to-day
activities and the place for senior management to execute their duties is mainly located in China; strategic management over finance and personnel decisions are made or approved by an establishment or individual in China; the enterprise’s major asset, accounting records, corporate seals and minutes of board
of directors and shareholders meetings are located or maintained in China; and at least 50% of the board
members with voting rights or senior management habitually reside in China. Notice 82, supra note 213,
at art. 2.
216
The latest movement in the PE circle is to set up Renminbi-based funds in China which may help
foreign PE investors create more inroads into China. Sundeep Tucker and Jamil Anderlini, Carlyle to Set
Up Renminbi-based Fund in Beijing, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/6e5e827e-ffe3-11de-ad8c-00144feabdc0.html.
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4. National Security Review Rules in 2011
For the purpose of guiding foreign investors’ mergers and acquisitions
of domestic enterprises and safeguarding national security, the General Office of the State Council issued the Notice on Establishment of the Security
Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors (“State Council Circular 6”) on February 3, 2011.217 The
national security regime focuses on foreign investors’ mergers and acquisitions of all types of enterprises such as military industry enterprises and
their ancillary enterprises, the enterprises around key and sensitive military
facilities and other units which have an impact on national defense security
and which may result in foreign investors’ acquisition of actual control over
enterprises connected to Chinese national security.218
New security review rules from MOFCOM,219 effective on September
1, 2011, clarify national security review procedures for foreign investments
in Chinese companies and bar the use of arcane investment structures or
techniques such as “multi-level reinvestment,” “nominee shareholders,” and
“control by agreement” to evade China’s security review process. The relevant provision reads:
Whether a merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise by a foreign investor falls within the scope of merger and acquisition security review shall be determined on the basis of the substance and actual impact of the transaction. No foreign investor shall substantially
evade the merger and acquisition security review in any form, including but not limited to proxy, trust, multi-level reinvestment,
lease, loan, variable interest entities (agreement-based control) and
offshore transaction.220

Although the rules are worded in a vague manner for application, they
implicitly target the “round-trip investment” model and explicitly leave
regulators with more discretionary powers. The term “multi-level reinvest217
Guowuyuan Bangong Ting Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzi Zhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Anquan
Shencha Zhidu de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的通知)
[The Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the
General Office of the State Council, effective March, 3 2011) [hereinafter Nationl Security Review
Rules] (China).
218
Id. at art. 1.
219
Shangwu Bu Shishi Waiguo Touzi Zhe Binggou Jingnei Jingnei Qiye Anquan Shencha Zhidu De
Guiding (商务部公告 2011 年第 53 号 商务部实施外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的规定)
[Regulations on the Implementation of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Announcement [2011] No. 53] (promulgated by the Ministry
of Commerce (MOFCOM), effective Sept. 1, 2011), art. 9, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/201108/26/content_1934046.htm [hereinafter MOFCOM Rules] (China).
220
Id. at art. 9.
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ment” is explicitly highlighted as a form used by foreign investors to evade
the security review regime. It is clear that the “round-trip investment” model will be deemed as a domestic enterprise actually controlled by a foreign
investor and thus will be subject to a security review. Both the State Council Circular and MOFCOM Rules have adopted a clearly restrictive approach to applying the security review rules to foreign investment projects,
and signaled the authorities’ intention to place the “round-trip investment”
model under deeper and heavier regulatory scrutiny and supervision. Nevertheless, given the vagueness of rules, the exact scope of implementation
remains unclear. Most likely, the “round-trip investment” model will be
subject to closer scrutiny in future transactions.
A literal reading of the aforementioned rules and interpretations 221
shows it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not entirely impossible, for
Chinese residents to take advantage of SPVs to inflow “round-tripping” investments or make public or private offerings in the overseas capital markets. These regulatory changes significantly tighten the regulatory environment for offshore restructurings transactions. The motives of MOFCOM,
SAFE, the Taxation Bureau and other authorities appear to include preventing China’s high-quality assets from being listed overseas, to monitor the
foreign currency flows and—probably more importantly—to secure domestic listings and tax revenues.
Circular 75 and M&A Rules, together with other regulatory measures,
are a revival of previous regulatory attempts to address the disguised FDI in
the form of the “round-trip investment” model, either of which causes a
huge loss to the national welfare. For instance, businessmen and top corrupt
officials may use SPVs to transfer state-owned assets, launder corruption
proceeds and avoid tax liabilities, as SPVs are easily packaged as shell
companies without any substantial assets. 222 Where the SPVs, trust and
221

See Circular 75, supra note 195; M&A Rules, supra note 207; Guojia Waihui Guanli Ju Zonghe
Si Guanyu Yinfa Guojia Waihui Guanli Ju Guanyu Jingnei Jumin Tongguo Jingwai Teshu Mudi Gongsi
Rongzi Ji Fancheng Touzi Waihui Guanli Youguan Wenti De Tongshi Caozuo Guicheng de Tongzhi (
国家外汇管理局综合司关于印发《国家外汇管理局关于境内居民通过境外特殊目的公司融资及返
程投资外汇管理有关 问题的通 知》操作规程的通知, 国家外汇 管理局综合司文件, 汇综发
[2007]106 号) [Operating Procedures Regarding Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange Control on Financing and Round-trip Investment Through Offshore Special Purpose Companies by Domestic Residents (Circular 106)] (promulgated by the State Administration on Foreign Exchange (SAFE), effective
May 27, 2007) [hereinafter Circular 106] (China); Tax Notice 82, supra note 213; National Security
Review Rules, supra note 217; MOFCOM Rules, supra note 219.
222
Structuring pyramids of shell companies in various tax havens for aggressive tax evasion and
avoidance is a common practice. In the context of the financial crisis, this common practice has been
severely under attack. For instance, Google’s billions in revenue garnered every year by its sales force in
the UK is not subject to local tax because of the technical closure of Google’s Dublin office. Philip Stephens, Why Google and Eric Schmidt Really Don’t Care About Tax, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/28b783de-c857-11e2-acc6-00144feab7de.html. Amazon, Apple and other multinationals all have elaborate tax avoidance planning by relying on the use of shell companies.
Vanessa Houlder, Apple Tax Probe Helps Drive to Build Consensus on Global Regime, FIN. TIMES
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bearer shares are used, the ultimate shareholders of the business may be
covered or disguised well through various layers of corporate veils and cannot be easily tracked down. If the “round-trip” investment truly constitutes
25% to 50% of the total FDI into China,223 it exaggerates China’s foreign
exchange reserves.224 This could increase the political pressure on China to
re-evaluate the exchange rate between Renminbi and the US dollar.225
(May 23, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7de48b8-c3bc-11e2-8c30-00144feab7de.html.
223
Empirically, it is very difficult to quantify the amount of “round-trip” investments in a dollar
value. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
224
China’s foreign exchange reserves reached US $853.7 billion in February 2006, surpassing those
of Japan to become the largest in the world, http://www.pbc.gov.cn. .
225
The Renminbi or Yuan, the Chinese currency, has been a high profile and long-running subject
of controversy between China and its trade partners, especially the United States, the European Union
and Japan. China has been accused of intentionally manipulating the Renminbi’s exchange rate to the
US dollar to gain a competitive advantage and keep its exports artificially cheaper. The under-valued
Renminbi, as often asserted, is the key reason for China’s growth in its unparalleled foreign exchange
reserves and trade surpluses, as well as for global economic imbalances. As to how much the Renminbi
is misaligned, there is substantial disagreement in various research, ranging from 1% to 56% undervaluation. See W.L. Chou & Y.C. Shih, The Equilibrium Exchange Rate of the Chinese Renminbi, 26 J.
COMPARATIVE ECON.165, 174 (1998) (claiming that the Renminbi was about 10% undervalued at the
beginning of the 1990s); Fred Bergsten, We Can Fight Fire with Fire on the Renminbi, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
4, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/070e525c-cf1d-11df-9be2-00144feab49a.html (claiming that
the Renminbi is still undervalued by at least 20% after its appreciation from 2005 to date); Morris Goldstein, Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies 15 (Institute for Int’l Econ. Working Paper 04-1, 2004)
(arguing that the Renminbi is undervalued by at least 15–25%); Ernest H. Preeg, Exchange Rate Manipulation to Gain an Unfair Competitive Advantage: The Case Against Japan and China in DOLLAR
OVERVALUATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 267–84 (C. Fred Bergsten & John Williamson eds.,
2003) (estimating that the Renminbi exchange rate undervaluation is about 40%). Also, there are proponents against the idea that China should alter its exchange rate. See Ronald McKinnon & Gunther
Schnabl, China: A Stabilizing or Deflationary Influence in East Asia? The Problem of Conflicted Virtue
(2003),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/
credpr196.pdf. US lawmakers, led by Senators Charles Schumer and Leslie Graham, threatened to sanction China by imposing a 27.5% tariff on Chinese imports in order to pressure China to raise the value of
the Renminbi. See US Lawmakers Turn up Yuan Heat, STANDARD (Hong Kong) (Jun. 13, 2007),
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/archive_news_detail.asp?pp_cat=5&art_id=46684&sid=14033609&con
_type=1&archive_d_str=20070613. The US House of Representatives passed legislation that would
punish China for undervaluing its currency and damaging the competitiveness of US manufacturers and
exporters. The US administration, however, preferred to pursue a policy of engagement with China with
the view of persuading China to allow the Renminbi to strengthen while enhancing its own negotiating
position by mounting congressional pressure. See James Politi, House to Hit Back on Renminbi, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), http://big5.ftchinese.com/story/001034887/en/. Meanwhile, the US administration also sought to organize a coalition within the framework of the G20. Alan Beattie, US-China Trade
Ties: A Heated Exchange FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8d773dbc-1c2a11e1-9631-00144feabdc0.html. In October 2011, the U.S. Senate passed a bill that would allow the U.S.
to levy retaliatory, across-the-board tariffs on Chinese imports according to estimates of currency misalignment. However, the Republican leaders opposed the move and resisted bringing a similar bill to a
vote in the House of Representatives. Alan Beattie, Renminbi’s Threat to Dominant Dollar Grows, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at 6. The Renminbi appreciated by 2.5% on July 21, 2005, when the Chinese
government announced to re-peg Renminbi from the US dollar and allowed it to float within a band.
China allowed Renminbi to appreciate to a 19-year high on October 13, 2012, against the US dollar,
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An array of rules and circulars from MOFCOM, SAFE and the Taxation Bureau from 2005 to 2012, peaking with the of the State Council’s new
national security review regime, are vivid examples of the tension between
China’s regulatory concerns addressing high-quality domestic assets being
drained overseas and the motivation of foreign investors to “vote with their
feet” for an international standard regime in which the transaction can be
organized in a highly automated and structured manner. It signals the regulatory body’s intention to, with a “responsive,” or “tit for tat” approach,226
integrate offshore transactions into the Chinese regulatory framework. Cir-

right before the US presidential election. On the other hand, the Renminbi, as it is said, only appreciated
by over one-tenth on a trade-weighted basis even though it appreciated by one-fifth against the dollar in
the past five years. While the currency is appreciating, the growth of China’s foreign currency reserves
is flattening. Renminbi – Yuan Direction, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.afi.es/EO/
Renminbi%20%E2%80%93%20yuan%20direction%20-%20FT.pdf. While appreciation of the
Renminbi is an incremental and irreversible trend, the Chinese government has also been carrying on its
promise to make the Renminbi exchange rate a volatile and two-way trade. The Renminbi is now allowed to float within a band, up or down 1% from a daily reference rate against the dollar that is set by
the PBOC. Simon Rabinovitch, China Steers Renminbi Two-way Trade, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/018d7b38-1f5b-11e2-b2ad-00144feabdc0.html.
Previously,
the
Renminbi only moved one way. Renminbi is better priced by the market after it was allowed to flow in a
band. Enoch Yiu, London Pushes Ahead with Yuan Ambitions, South China Morning Post (Dec. 3,
2012),
http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1095829/london-pushes-ahead-yuanambitions.. PBOC doubled the trading band to 1% on either side of the bank’s daily reference rate in
April, 2012, and is expected to widen the band to 1.5 to 2% soon. A widened band can give traders
greater leeway to push the yuan up or down. Jane Cai, PBOC Poised to Widen Trading Band of Yuan, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/
1217839/trading-band-yuan-be-widened. A widened trading band will allow market forces to play a
larger role as it will encourage two-way volatility and avoid the one-way bet on the Yuan strengthening.
However, the widening of the band would not necessarily lead to a strengthening of the Yuan. Spot Yuan closed on June 4, 2013, at 6.1287 per dollar in Shanghai. It has been hitting 19-year highs frequently
in the past few months and has strengthened about 1.7% against the dollar since April 2013. That has
already suppressed the 1.03% appreciation for the whole of last year while capital unleashed by quantitative easing in developed countries flooded into China betting on robust economic growth and greater
financial reforms. The Yuan could reach another key psychological level in 2014 to trade at 6 to the US
dollar as the Chinese regulators seem included to ease the reins on the currency further. It is possible for
spot dollar-yuan to fall below six figures. However, the yuan’s persistent appreciation is not supported
by economic fundamentals. China’s trade surplus totaled US $43 billion in the first quarter of 2013 but
the surplus adjusted for overstated exports to Hong Kong was only US $2.4 billion. With the current
account surplus set to narrow and the growth of foreign direct investment likely to slow as the Chinese
economy gears down, further gains in the Yuan should be quite limited. IMF, however, estimates the
actual value of the Yuan was 4.214 to the dollar in 2012, based on the purchasing power parity. Jane
Cai, Yuan Heads for Key Level Against Dollar, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 5, 2013),
http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1253661/yuan-heads-key-level-against-dollar. The Yuan closed trading on 27 May 2013 at 6.12 to the dollar, 35% stronger than its June 2003 rate. The Yuan:
The Cheapest Thing Going is Gone, ECONOMIST (Jun. 15, 2013)., http://www.economist.com/news/
china/21579488-after-enduring-decade-criticism-its-weakness-chinas-currency-now-looksuncomfortably. The latest surge in the Renminbi’s normal exchange rate is puzzling as it comes at a time
of disappointing growth, falling inflation and flagging exports.
226
See generally, IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992).
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cular 698 is unique in the sense that the government substitutes public tax
program for regulatory means, and extends its jurisdiction to cross-border
commercial activities. In a socioeconomic order, there have been a variety
of means to meet social goals or respond to perceived social problems. Each
regulatory technique is likely to generate a distinct pattern of gains and
losses. Various additional governmental approval requirements and procedural delays may cause a chilling effect on many legitimate transactions
that actually sustain FDI flows. 227 The regulatory intervention may ultimately deter FDI activities essential to improving the efficiency of the corporate law regime, which is in line with findings that government programs
often hinder rather than help the growth of FDI activities.228
A series of regulatory movements have led to a substantial drop of
outbound investment to the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands, as
indicated in Table 3 above. In 2012, outbound investment to the Cayman
Islands and British Virgin Islands was only 0.9% and 2.6% of China’s total
outbound investment respectively. This again confirms the correlation between regulatory design and economic activities.
Anti-tax avoidance measures can easily provoke controversy for two
simple reasons. First, these measures have a tendency to increase the complexity and volume of new tax rules, which increases compliance costs in
the corporate sector. Second, there is a natural outcry in the market due to
political controversy over the role of the state in shaping public interest.
While it can be argued that the regulatory regime generates too few benefits
compared to costs, a public tax program may create a direct deterrent effect
and have too few beneficiaries except the government itself. The major
concern here is that the government, as the sole beneficiary of the public tax
program, may have sheltered the tax regime from cost-benefit scrutiny on
the grounds that tax is thought to be designed to protect the public more efficaciously.
The deeper concern is related to the relationship between the corporate
sector and the government, and the mediating role of the corporate tax code
in between. The normative theory is that the public law status of the corporate tax code dictates the complexity and priority of the corporate tax law.
Meanwhile, it has been well recognised that the public or national interest
in corporate taxation is not necessarily in line with business interests. It is
also no surprise to see corporate tax law in some cases fails to respond to
the commercial and financial developments sought by society. A sensible
regulatory instrument is the one which can align both interests simultane227
See Round-trip Investments Key to Reversing FDI Decline, CHINA LAW & PRAC. (May 8, 2009),
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/2194941/Channel/9933/Round-trip-investments-key-toreversing-FDI-decline.html.
228
See generally John Armour & Douglas Cumming, The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley, 58
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 596 (2006).
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ously. This gap needs to be conceptualized in a way that anatomises the nature of the engagement between the corporate (investment) sector and the
government. An ideological consensus should be that strong economic
growth is a core element of the public (national) interest. The complexity
here is that the public interest in China may largely lean towards the stateowned sector rather than the private or foreign-investor sector. In this regard, the shape of the corporate tax base in China is reflective of conscious
political choices.229
Although the “round-trip investment” model is unique to China, the
establishment of statutes and regulations to prevent abuse of tax treaties and
tax havens through the use of cross-border business structures is not. Spearheaded by the world’s largest economies, there is a global trend towards
tightening loopholes and sharing information to secure revenue and prevent
tax evasion. Although the implications to company law remain of questionable legitimacy, examined within the context of this new global order, Circular 698 appears more reasonable. To offer a greater understanding of the
current global regulatory trend, the next section addresses anti-avoidance
measures taken in other jurisdictions and the global effort to share information and “crack down” on tax avoidance.
C. Global Emphasis on Increased Tax Revenue and Anti-Avoidance
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been a trend towards
governments trying to deal with tax evasion and avoidance so as to collect
more taxes.230 Several high-profile cases involving Google and Apple and
their tax avoidance planning have not only shone a harsh spotlight on the
international tax system but also injected urgency into the global effort to
229
The tensions between the corporate sector and the government in other advanced economies have
been managed in the context of successive administrations whose general ideologies place a high premium on the importance of the corporate sector in promoting the public interest. In this sense, the success
of the corporate sector is a critically important component of the national success. HM TREASURY AND
HMRC, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM (Nov. 2010),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81303/corporate_tax_refo
rm_complete_document.pdf.
230
The latest example is a plan of 11 European countries to impose a financial transaction tax: 0.1%
on stocks and bonds and 0.01% for derivatives. The tax is designed to be applied widely in cases where
a buyer, seller or issuer is located in a financial transaction tax-levying state. The underlying rationale of
imposing this tax is that financial trading is under-taxed relative to the rest of the economy because of
the exemption of value-added tax in the financial sector. Imposing financial transaction tax will raise
€34 billion per year. Financial Transaction Tax: Don’t Panic, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/371999a2-c2f9-11e2-9bcb-00144feab7de.html. Opponents, however,
claim that the imposition of financial transaction tax would kill financial growth, rob pensioners, impoverish financial institutions, destroy transactional models involving banks, bankers and exchanges, lower
investor returns, increase borrowing costs, and worsen the EU debt crisis.. Avinash Persaud, Europe
Should Embrace a Financial Transaction Tax, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ba8e4232-c79b-11e2-9c52-00144feab7de.html.
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crack down on aggressive tax avoidance. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) has drawn up a plan to reform the
global tax rules and identified more than a dozen issues that need reform,
which, if adopted, could lead to a drastic change in international tax standards. It has been reported that the OECD is likely to propose changes to
“hybrids” or regulatory arbitrage, the structures and instruments that exploit
differences between different regimes’ tax codes, and more importantly, to
work out a multilateral treaty so as to revise double tax treaties. In this
sense, Circular 698 can be viewed as a unilateral regulatory attempt made
by the Chinese government in this global reform effort. The scenario Circular 698 is trying to tackle is similar to the paradox the US tax reform is facing. Apple, for example, as reported, has US$102 billion in foreign cash reserves, but the reserves are not subject to US tax unless they are repatriated
to the United States.231 In other words, Apple has paid little or no tax for its
earnings in the amount of tens of billions of dollars by making use of subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland and Irish tax loopholes.232 Similarly, Apple
did not pay UK corporate tax in 2012 even though it has a number of subsidiaries in the UK, which made pre-tax profits of £68 million in the first
three quarters of 2012.233 Google, as reported, similarly only paid £ 10.6
million in taxes even though it generated £12 billion in revenues from the
UK from 2006 to 2011.234 A US Senate committee in May 2013 highlighted
Apple’s overseas tax rate of less than 2%. The loopholes in the US tax law
have allowed US multinationals to park nearly US $2 trillion of lightly
taxed foreign earnings in tax havens.235 As a result, this has turned out to be
a “non-double taxation” scenario, leaving some cross-border commercial
transactions and lightly taxed “stateless” income generated out of these
transactions ultimately untaxed. The paradox in relation to the US corporate
231
The challenging part of the US corporate tax reform is to tax global companies. US companies
are taxed on their foreign profits, with a credit for taxes paid to other governments only when they repatriate these profits. The current tax system can be an additional burden on American multinationals as
they suffer losses from bringing money home, but the tax may raise little revenue.
232
James Fontanella-Khan & Jamie Smyth, Ireland Pledges Cooperation on Global Tax Avoidance
Plan, FIN. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1accd5b2-c2d5-11e2-9bcb00144feab7de.html. The economic rights to the goods Apple sold were held in Ireland. As reported in
2011, 84% of Apple’s non-US operating income was booked by Apple Sales International, an Irish subsidiary which was not a tax resident anywhere and which only paid tax at a rate of 0.05%. Vanessa
Houlder, Apple Paid No UK Corporation Tax in 2012, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13273fae-e1a3-11e2-95c1-00144feabdc0.html.
233
Tax deduction from share awards to employees helped wipe out the corporation tax liabilities of
the UK subsidiaries in the year to September 2012. UK subsidiaries reported tax deductions relating to
share scheme of £27.7 million. Vanessa Houlder, Figures Shed Light on Tax Avoidance Haul, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aad0297e-b020-11e2-8d07-00144feabdc0.html.
234
Ed Hammond, Google Chairman Schmidt in Taxing Hunt for London Home, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 5,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/01677132-e561-11e2-ad1a-00144feabdc0.html.
235
Lawrence Summers, Help American Businesses – Tax Their Profits Abroad, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 7,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b9eaee46-e4d5-11e2-875b-00144feabdc0.html.
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tax code provides a certain level of legitimacy to the Chinese tax authority’s
efforts.
On the other hand, China’s regulatory move to put Circular 698 in
place has also highlighted the difficulty of global cooperation on tax reform
as the nations’ well-established instinct is to use the tax system to compete.
Lighter fiscal regime often attracts tax payers’ reallocation of their tax residency. In reality, it is a trade war by another name—fought with income tax
policies rather than tariffs. The best example is probably the UK. While the
UK is expressing outrage at Apple and Google for stripping income and potential tax revenue out of the UK, it is simultaneously engaged in “beggarthy-neighbour” policies by attracting Italy’s Fiat Industrial to move its tax
residency to the UK. While some countries have had a long history of having low corporate tax rates, there is a sign that other countries are joining a
global race to cut rates. Portugal recently announced plans to lower its 24%
corporate tax rate whilst the US government proposed eliminating business
tax breaks to reduce the 35% corporate tax rate and the UK government
plans to cut the corporate tax rate to 20%, the lowest in the G20. 236 The
chief theory underpinning such regulatory competition is a free-rider problem: each state likes others to clamp down on tax avoidance without having
to touch its own tax codes and tax regime.
The regulatory moves made by some other developed countries and
the underlying regulatory competition theories indeed justify China’s unilateral and expansive regulatory move to catch offshore commercial activities under its realm. More relevant in this case, Circular 698 can be regarded as China’s attempt to strengthen its ability to tax Chinese investors’
profits generated from China-based assets. There is basically a lighter
chance to have a more economically neutral and appropriate paradigm
while all the countries are competing with each other in this game. As a result, the efforts made so far are to increase the level of transparency, which
is used as a powerful weapon against tax avoidance, rather than ratifying
the current international tax system.237 At the global level, the crackdown
236
Houlder, supra note 233. The underlying reason that the governments in developed economies
are forced into austerity regimes is probably because of budget deficits.
237
The key problem of the current international tax system is how the profits of multinational companies are allocated to individual countries. The allocation is usually made on the basis of the location of
economic activities or ownership of various assets which are, however, mobile in nature. As a result,
some assets can be located in regimes with lower tax rates. The reform of the international tax regime—
that is, a set of anti-avoidance rules—is to prevent companies taking undue advantage. Because the less
mobile element in business activities is consumers, the government can tax the profits of a multinational
company to the extent that it has sales to third parties who reside in the country. Imposing such a tax
seems unlikely to induce people in that country to move to a tax haven. Implementing this tax can rely
on the “destination principle” (the principle is codified in the value-added tax law). The basic approach
is to tax income generated from sales in a particular country and give relief for expenditure incurred in
that particular country. This can be achieved by taxing imports. Focusing on the residence of the customer can avoid some complexities involved in the VAT rules. The advantages of this “destination prin-
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on tax evasion has been intensified due to the US’s threat to charge a 30%
withholding tax on foreign banks that did not divulge US client information
under its 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).238 The EU
is increasing efforts to clamp down on tax avoidance by wealthy investors
such as private equity and hedge funds. The EU’s largest five economies
including the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have agreed to share
confidential information on individual’s investment income and capital
gains and, more substantially, to extend such rules to the rest of EU members.239 The EU is to adopt the EU version of FATCA. The G8, for example, is trying to put a country-by-country reporting scheme in place so as to
benefit local tax authorities, especially those in developing countries that
have limited capacity to collate tax-related information themselves. The
G20 has thrown weight behind the automatic exchange of tax information.240 Globally, there have been 800 tax information exchange agreements
since 2009. However, the effectiveness of these agreements is doubtful as
tax evaders are, other than repatriating funds, now shifting deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. Therefore, a pressing
need is an international agreement on how to link tax bases to real economic activity and limit the creation of letterbox subsidiaries whose sole
purpose is to locate the most profitable portion of the businesses in low-tax
(or no-tax) regimes. This again calls for a much higher level of regulatory
harmonisation (compared to somewhat ill-designed double taxation treaties)
for a common consolidated corporate tax base.

ciple” are multi-faceted. For instance, transfer prices charged for intra-company trade would not affect
the tax base. The location of economic activity would not be affected because tax would not depend on
the location or production or other factors. Competitive pressure or motivation to reduce the corporate
tax rate to attract economic activity is also weakened. The US is planning to implement such a salescentered corporate tax—the corporate tax is imposed where sales are generated. Eric Schmidt, Why We
Need to Simplify Our Corporate Tax System, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 16, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dfeeceae-d69e-11e2-9214-00144feab7de.html. The other option is a significant increase in corporate tax rates globally but the implementation of this option may result in less
innovation, less growth and less job creation.
238
The website of the Foreign Account Tax Compliace Act (FATCA) is
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act.
239
The EU tax commissioner is to issue a reform proposal that requires tax authorities to automatically exchange banking details on capital gains, dividends and royalties. Currently, EU agreements on
tax sharing have applied to interest on savings and deposits, rather than more complex investment structures. James Fontanella-Khan & Alex Barker, Brussels Steps Up Efforts Over Tax Avoidance, FIN.
TIMES (May 5, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c0a8b634-b571-11e2-a51b-00144feabdc0.html.
240
Vanessa Houlder, Finance Ministers Step Up War on Tax Evasion, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/095afdca-a90a-11e2-a096-00144feabdc0.html.
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1. European Approach to Cracking Down on Aggressive Tax
Planning
Authorities in Europe have been taking increasingly tough stances on
tax avoidance and financial secrecy over the past few years, forcing domestic and international investors to change their tax planning strategies. More
cases have been reported recently as a result of a clampdown by Italian finance police on tax evasion while the European sovereign debt crisis roiled
more countries. The widespread use of holding companies registered in
Luxembourg has been a specific target of tax authorities as member states
in the EU seek to boost state coffers by returning billions of euros estimated
to be held in tax havens.
In one high-profile case, Italian fashion designers Domenico Dolce
and Stefano Gabbana received suspended prison sentences of a year and
eight months and were fined nearly half a million euros by a court in Milan
for evading millions in taxes. Dolce and Gabbana are the owners of a multinational fashion group and sold their brand to Gado, a Luxembourg-based
holding company, in 2004 in order to avoid declaring more than €100 million in royalties. Gado subsequently took control of the Italy-based business. Dolce and Gabbana were also fined nearly €500 million, opening up
the possibility that the tax policy may allow the government to seize shares
in the company and company assets. The prosecutor argued that the designers conducted a “sophisticated tax fraud and set up the Luxembourg holding
company specifically to evade taxes.”241
The ruling handed down by the court is a clear sign that the Italian tax
authorities and judiciary are looking more aggressively than ever at evasive
or abusive schemes implemented by Italian companies of all sizes. The case
comes at a time that some European companies have sought to set up international structures for legitimate and legal reasons as domestic demand no
longer offers growth for their local businesses. These structures, meanwhile, are used as a means of obtaining tax advantages. Nevertheless, in the
context of the current financial crisis, these structures may be categorized as
abusive tax avoidance schemes. Italian tax police also seized assets owned
by Roman jeweler Bulgari and the Marzotto textile dynasty in recent raids
on the grounds of tax avoidance.
The UK government also made an announcement in 2013 that it would
crack down on aggressive tax planning. This new movement to close tax
loopholes has prompted some wealthy individuals and companies to restructure their businesses in a more transparent and holistic manner. Back in
2004, the UK passed the disclosure of tax strategies legislation which
241
Rachel Sanderson, Dolce and Gabbana Get Suspended Sentence and €500m Tax Evasion Fine,
FIN.
TIMES
(June
20,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ab958622-d8f4-11e2-a6cf00144feab7de.html.
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forced taxpayers to declare any strategy or scheme that bore certain hallmarks. Governments across the EU and the world are using similar plans to
identify and scrutinize existing tax planning schemes leading more investors to adopt more straightforward tax planning options since they fear being seen as an “untapped” resource. The changing regulatory climate is
pushing the wealthiest members of society to pay their “fair share” of tax,
which is also a popular and effective political rallying cry at a time of widespread global austerity measures.
The EU announced plans to tackle the well-known tax avoidance arrangement so as to ensure a level playing field for “honest” businesses in
the single market. Due to a mismatch between different countries’ tax systems, companies can minimize their tax liability by using hybrid instruments such as convertible preference shares or profit participating loans,
which may be regarded as equity in some countries but debt in others. According to the EU plan, countries are required to tax payments arriving from
a subsidiary in another member state where such payments had been treated
as a tax-deductible expense.242 Along with this rule, the EU Commission is
to introduce an anti-abuse rule in order to stop companies from setting up
“wholly artificial” intermediary groups to avoid tax. If these rules were put
in place, the benefits would be in the magnitude of billions of Euros. As the
plan needs unanimous consent from all the member states, it may be difficult to be passed without encountering any resistance. While these initiatives may constitute a contribution to the international work on tackling tax
base erosion and profit shifting, they are not immune from controversy for
at least two technical reasons. First, it is debatable whether the hybrid
schemes are abusive or not. Second, the implementation of these initiatives
may lend a competitive advantage to companies based outside the EU or to
private equity funds, which are not affected by these proposed changes. To
step up its probe into alleged illegal tax-avoidance practices, the EU Commission recently expanded the investigation to cover arrangements for patent-holders by issuing an information injunction against Luxembourg and
ordering it to reveal its specific promises made in the tax rulings between
2011 and 2012 to specific companies.243
Liechtenstein has stepped up its efforts to shed its reputation as one of
the most secretive havens in the world and pressed ahead with automatic
exchange of tax information and promising to sign a global tax agree-

242
Rebecca Christie, EU Seeks to Force Firms to Pay Tax on Hybrid-Loan Payments, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-25/eu-seeks-to-force-companies-topay-tax-on-hybrid-loan-payments.html; Vanessa Houlder, Europe Unveils Crackdown on Cross-border
Tax ‘Hybrid’ Schemes, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e45b0dc2-37e711e3-8668-00144feab7de.html.
243
Alex Barker, EU Steps up Probe into Tax Sweeteners for Multinationals, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2014.
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ment.244 This move is a positive sign of the intensifying global crackdown
on tax evasion that is forcing tax havens to open up and deal with their legacy of undeclared assets and develop new business models for their secretive financial sectors.245 By taking this step, Liechtenstein appeared ready to
combine “guaranteed tax compliance with effective tax cooperation and effective, efficient automatic information exchange based on the future
OECD standard.” Liechtenstein is to build on an agreement with the UK
which took the form of a partial amnesty announced in 2009 to prompt investors to declare their secret accounts. The UK has collected about £600
million from 3,000 individuals who used the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility. The arrangement posed low penalties to individuals who owned up to
undeclared offshore assets, backed up by a promise to close the accounts of
customers who could not prove they had paid their taxes in their home
country.
2. The United States Approach
The US corporate tax system is not problem-free. First, there is a
mishmash of credits and deductions that encourages companies to contort
themselves to reduce their tax bill. Second, the tax rates are too high. The
statutory rate is 35%, the second highest in the world. This 35% tax rate is
also applied to repatriated cash. The US has a higher corporate tax rate than
any other leading economy, and imposes severe taxes on income earned
outside its borders. This severely affects US-incorporated multinationals’
global competitiveness and discourages the repatriation of profits earned
abroad. Third, corporate profits are extraordinarily high relative to gross
domestic product but tax collection is low. The US corporate profits peaked
at more than US$2 trillion in 2012. However, corporate tax receipts peaked
not in 2012 but in 2007. In effect, the tax rate in 2012 was just 16% (aggregated taxes divided by aggregate pre-tax profit), down from 29% in 2000.246
The challenging part of the corporate tax reform is the taxation of global
companies. Currently, US companies are taxed on their foreign profits, with
a credit for taxes paid to other governments, only when they repatriate these
profits. A rough estimation is that American businesses are holding nearly
US$2 trillion in cash abroad. 247 The current system can be a burden on
244
Vanessa Houlder & James Shotter, Liechtenstein Moves to Shed Reputation as Secretive Tax Haven, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at 6.
245
Liechtenstein yielded to international pressure by agreeing to sign up to international standards
on transparency after the LGT Bank scandal in 2008. Lynnley Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like
a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES (August 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/business/
worldbusiness/15kieber.html.
246
US Corporate Taxes: Who Pays More?, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013) (online).
247
Lawrence Summers, Help American Businesses – Tax Their Profits Abroad, FIN. TIMES (July 7,
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b9eaee46-e4d5-11e2-875b-00144feabdc0.html. It is reported that
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American multinationals as they suffer losses from bringing money home
and the tax raises little revenue. From the multinationals’ perspective, there
is a strong reason to delay repatriating earnings to the US even though there
is no desirability of doing so: keeping money abroad to the detriment of
companies and the American fiscals. However, from shareholders’ perspective, the multinationals may have to repatriate money back to the US and
may have to pay taxes on their foreign profits. The US Senate Finance
Committee unveiled the proposal for a sweeping rewrite of the US tax code.
Likely, the US would impose a one-time 20% tax on an estimated US$2
trillion of cash held overseas by American multinationals.248
In a cross-border context, the US tax law also has loopholes. For instance, multinationals with big US operations may take advantage of a socalled tower structure, a hybrid scheme that complies with individual country’s tax laws while exploiting inconsistencies between them, to achieve a
double tax deduction. It is a popular alternative to the more widely used
strategy of routing inter-company loans through tax havens such as setting
up an SPV in a tax haven to lend money to a subsidiary in a higher tax
country. The scheme makes use of the 1997 US so-called check-the-box
rules that allow companies to elect to disregard a subsidiary by ticking a
box on a tax form. The rules, originally designed as a simplification, provided planning opportunities to foreign companies operating in the US as
well as US multinationals to cut their tax bills as foreign subsidiaries can
disappear into their parent companies for US tax purposes. The best example is FirstGroup’s acquisition of Laidlaw, the US yellow school bus operator. FirstGroup, the UK transport group, financed the acquisition with a
US$1.8 billion intra-group loan. Interest on the loan however was paid by
FirstGroup US Holdings, a new UK company used as a hybrid entity to
own the target company. A check-the-box option for FirstGroup US Holdings means that any transactions would be regarded for US tax purposes as
occurring in its parent, FirstGroup US Inc. The US tax authorities view the
interest payments as coming from the US parent, resulting in a US tax deduction. The UK tax authorities on the other hand regard the loan as a UK
company making a loan to another UK company within the same group.
The interest income would be taxable in the UK but the interest paid would
be tax deductible in the UK. The net result would be no taxable income in
the UK. The overall group benefits as interest income is taxable once but
the interest payment is tax deductible twice. The outcome is a cut in the cost

Caterpillar, Apple Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co. and Microsoft Corp. have been using controversial international tax practices to shift profits overseas. Maxwell Murphy, New Slant on Corporate Taxes, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 9, 2014, at B8.
248
James Politi, Democrats Eye Tax on Overseas Profits, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, at 1 (also saying that the changes to the international tax system would be paired with the elimination of some domestic corporate tax breaks and a reduction in the overall US corporate tax rate to between 25% and 30%).
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of corporate financing.249 The other way of phrasing the overall result is a
double tax deduction in both the UK and the US, which is offset by a single
UK tax payment on the interest received.250
The United States, under the Obama administration, has taken a leading role in pushing for global tax reform and the sharing of information, but
the majority of US efforts have focused on ensuring the US tax base from
citizens and American business entities. In addition to cracking down on tax
avoidance, the government sought increased income through rules unfavorable to tax payers. In 2010, the economic substance doctrine was codified
with a two-part conjunctive test—the least favorable approach for tax payers. Additionally, the tax code was modified to require US citizens abroad
to pay US income tax regardless of the income source (including Americans
living and working abroad)251—a move that results in double taxation or tax
avoidance behaviors by US citizens. This makes the US the only country in
the OECD that taxes its citizens without regard to residence. 252 The new
rules led to a record number of Americans, many of them millionaires living abroad, renouncing their citizenship in 2011. That year, 1,788 Americans renounced their citizenship, more than the previous three years combined. 253 For the remaining Americans, the US government has a large
financial incentive to receive income information and crack down on tax
avoidance.
In perhaps the largest global tax avoidance effort initiated to date, the
United States passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(“FATCA”).254 FATCA applies worldwide to every financial firm that receives payments from the US sources, requiring disclosure from financial
firms where accounts were maintained by US taxpayers to individuals or
companies where a US person owned more than a 10% interest in the firm.
Much like Circular 698, FATCA has an extraterritorial effect with a primary goal of protecting domestic tax revenue. The Act uses a two-pronged approach255 requiring US citizens and permanent residents (Green card holders) to report their accounts held outside the United States and requires
249
Similar results can be achieved in other countries by using partnerships or by using hybrid instruments such as preference shares, which are regarded as debt in one country but equity in the other.
250
Vanessa Houlder, Hybrid Tax Schemes Face Day of Reckoning, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at
15.
251
U.S. Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad, Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/
Individuals/International-Taxpayers/U.S.-Citizens-and-Resident-Aliens-Abroad (last visited September
16, 2013).
252
Americans Renounce their Citizenship in Record Numbers in 2011, http://rt.com/usa/uscitizenship-tax-denounce-521/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
253
Id.
254
The FATCA is a part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act and created 26
USC §§ 1471–1474 and 26 USC § 6038D.
255
FATCA also closed a tax loophole that allowed taxpayers to circumvent taxes of US dividends
by utilizing swap contracts.
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foreign financial institutions to provide the IRS with information on American clients.256
As with any tax provision designed to have an extraterritorial effect,
the fundamental difficulty is enforcement in foreign jurisdictions. To this
end, FATCA compels financial firms to disclose information on US taxpayers to the US government and requires US financial institutions and their
agents to withhold 30% on certain payments to foreign financial institutions
that fail to meet the FATCA requirements and report required information.257 In this way, foreign financial intuitions are forced to either comply with the statute or cease doing business with American clients. This is
in stark contrast to Circular 698 which fails to motivate foreign entities to
disclose information to the Chinese tax authority—an omission that makes
Circular 698 greatly ineffective. It appears that Circular 698 reporting is
undertaken on a voluntary and self-reporting basis. The enforcement of Circular 698 largely depends on how actively the local tax bureaus would seek
to strictly enforce Circular 698. Also borrowing from the US approach,
China could seek agreements with individual governments for the disclosure of financial information used to determine tax payments. In order to
facilitate compliance with FATCA and collect information on accounts held
by American’s and their businesses, the US government entered into
agreements with individual nations and the U.S. Department of the Treasury created model FATCA agreements.258 The need for agreements is not
256
The United States is one of the only countries that require non-resident citizens to pay taxes on
foreign income with Eritrea being another. See Eritrea: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03166.pdf (July, 2003). PWC,
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act – New U.S. Rules That Will Affect Non-U.S. Entities,
http://www.pwc.com/ca/en/banking-capital-markets/publications/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act2010-10-en.pdf (last visited November 14, 2013)
257
FATCA supra; See also Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-(FATCA) (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
258
Resource Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013); See also Reciprocal Model 1A Agreement, Preexisting TIEA or DTC, U.S. Department of the Treasury, (June 6, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Reciprocal-Model-1AAgreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC-6-6-14.pdf; Nonreciprocal Model 1B Agreement, Preexisting
TIEA or DTC, U.S. Department of the Treasury (June 6, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Nonreciprocal-Model-1B-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEAor-DTC-6-6-14.pdf; Nonreciprocal Model 1B Agreement, No TIEA or DTC, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
FATCA-Nonreciprocal-Model-1B-Agreement-No-TIEA-or-DTC-11-4-13.pdf; Model 2 Agreement,
Preexisting TIEA or DTC, U.S. Department of the Treasury, (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Model-2-Agreement-Preexisting-TIEA-or-DTC11-4-13.pdf; Model Agreement 2, No TIEA or DTC, U.S. Department of the Treasury, (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Model-2-AgreementNo-TIEA-or-DTC-11-4-13.pdf. The model agreements provide a reciprocal version, where the US provides information to the partner country, and a non-reciprocal version. Under model 1, foreign financial
institutions report information about American account holders to their government, which in turn pro-
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merely a result of the need for foreign cooperation, but the fact that compliance with FATCA may be illegal in foreign jurisdictions. The deputy director general of legal affairs at the People’s Bank of China said FATCA “creates unreasonable costs for foreign financial institutions and directly
contravenes many countries’ privacy and data protection laws.”259 He further elaborated that “China’s banking and tax laws and regulations do not
allow Chinese financial institutions to comply with FATCA directly.” 260
Currently, at least nine countries have entered into FATCA agreements with
the United States.261 With the exception of Mexico, a nation that is still a
member of the G20 and greatly reliant upon the United States for trade, the
countries entering into FATCA agreements with the US are developed nations—many with high tax rates. Therefore, most of these countries do not
benefit from US investors using their locations, tax codes, tax shelters or
hiding assets within their jurisdictions. The inability of the US to gain the
cooperation of tax haven jurisdictions highlights the difficulty China will
have in collecting data from these tax havens to determine when a sale has
taken place and enlisting the support of those nations in enforcing judgments against the selling party who may no longer hold assets within China.
However, it must be pointed out that FATCA will have a significant
impact on China. Cayman Islands has already concluded an agreement with
the US Treasury while the British Virgin Islands and the US have been in
talks to create an intergovernmental agreement to exchange information on
US taxpayers under FATCA. These moves put more pressure onto Hong
Kong to comply with FATCA in order to maintain its competitive edge.
Signing a similar pact would be a brand-enhancing move for China to attract more capital inflows. The pressure on financial firms in China to comply with FATCA stems from the fact that other financial firms would be
loath to do business with a non-compliant firm and customers would shun
non-compliant financial firms due to the withholding tax.
The economic substance doctrine is arguably the primary tax avoidance doctrine in the United States, as was codified in 2010.262 Although the
doctrine does not specifically target extraterritorial efforts at tax avoidance,
it may be applicable and demonstrates the government’s devotion to invides the information to the United States. Under Model 2, foreign financial intuitions report information on US account holders directly to the US government and the partner country agrees to remove
legal barriers to the aforementioned reporting.
259
China Central Bank Official Slams U.S. Tax Dodging Law, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/28/us-asia-regulation-china-idUSBRE8AR0N720121128, (quoting Liu Xiangmin, deputy director general of legal affairs at the People’s Bank of China).
260
Id.
261
The nine countries include Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United
Kingdom, Japan, and Switzerland. See Resource Center: FATCA-Archive, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx (last
visited Sep. 18, 2013).
262
26 USC §7701(o) (clarifying of Economic Substance Doctrine).
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creasing tax revenues, even through legislation extremely unfavorable to
taxpayers. The philosophy behind the doctrine is similar to the business
purpose doctrine in that the economic substance doctrine seeks to prevent
tax benefits resulting from business transactions motivated purely by tax
savings. In determining the existence of an economic benefit, the code employs a two-part conjunctive test requiring “the transaction changes in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”263 Prior to codification, various courts used the conjunctive test while others utilized a
disjunctive test, requiring the taxpayer to meet one of the two elements. 264
The codification is significantly less taxpayer friendly than the disjunctive
test and is therefore less evenhanded than the Ramsay principle.
In addition to its domestic efforts and extraterritorial efforts against US
citizens, the US has been a leader in the global effort against tax evasion.
The next subsection addresses the international efforts for global tax reform.
3. The G8, G20 and OECD – Global Tax Reform
Tax reform is not limited to domestic changes in Europe and the United States. British Prime Minister, David Cameron, introduced a 10 point
plan aimed at combating tax evasion during the G8 summit June 17–18,
2013, hosted by the United Kingdom after a wave of public anger over the
low tax bills paid by some large multinationals. Alongside advancing trade,
the UK government listed ensuring tax compliance and promoting greater
transparency (an important issue in monitoring attempts to evade taxes) as
the objectives of the summit. 265 Although the goals of the G8 summit
demonstrate a commitment on the part of the world’s most developed countries to combat tax evasion, the proposals of the Cameron administration
were too ambitions and failed to result in an agreement.266 The proposals
included making beneficial ownership267 information from businesses’ registries public and sharing tax information with other nations, with develop263

26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) & (B) (2013).
LAMPREAVE, supra note 112.
265
UK Presidency of G8, gov.uk, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/g8-2013 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013); See also Larry Elliot, G8 Summit: Tax Campaigners Condemn David Cameron’s
10-Point ‘Wish List’, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/g8summit-tax-evasion-david-cameron.
266
Elliot, supra note 265.
267
The term “beneficial owner” refers to the party with primary control and ownership rights. Reporting beneficial owners is important in combating tax evasion to prevent the nomination of “straw
men” as owners and directors in order to avoid monitoring by tax authorities, or in the case of terrorist
activities, police and intelligence agencies.
264
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ing countries being of particular concern.268 However, unlike China, where
the sole purpose of Circular 698 is to collect tax revenue, the motivation
behind the UK’s proposal includes preventing money laundering by terrorist organizations.
The recent G20 Summit hosted in Saint Petersburg by the Russian
Federation was intended to focus on growth, but tax quickly dominated the
agenda.269 The G20 member nations endorsed the creation of a global tax
standard that provides for the automatic exchange of tax information by the
end of 2015.270 This plan was originally proposed by the OECD, which is
working with G20 member countries to develop the standard of automatic
exchange of tax information. 271 This effort is the culmination of several
years of discussion. In 2011, G20 countries discussed the voluntary exchange of information for tax reasons.272 In 2012, the OECD presented a
report on exchanging tax information and urged countries to share information, and the current summit begins the more comprehensive scheme of
automatic information sharing. 273 Among others, hybrid structures are on
the list of loopholes to be closed in the crackdown launched in 2013 by the
G20.274
The OECD unveiled an action plan in July 2013 tackling tax evasion
by multinationals. The plan aligns tax in a location with the economic activity in that location, preventing the artificial shifting of multinationals’ reported business to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions like Cayman Islands,
Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands. According to OECD’s plan, tax
havens are required to disclose in a more transparent way the tax information of multinationals to the governments that taxed them. Other
measures include neutralizing the various methods multinationals use to
minimize their tax by “transfer pricing,” which is booking their profits
among different tax jurisdictions. The OECD has put in place a Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters which includes the new standard on automatic exchange of information. G20 nations
are expected to be part of the initiative. China has incentives to joint this
global framework so as to increase its right to tax, including by neutralizing
268
Id.; See also G8 Factsheet: Tax, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax#g8-action (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
269
See Russia in G20: Priorities of Russia’s G20 Presidency in 2013, THE GROUP OF 20,
http://www.g20.org/docs/g20_russia/priorities.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Russia set eight issues
on the G20 Summit agenda, of the 8 eight only two had a loose connection with tax—international financial architecture reform and strengthening financial regulation. The other issues focused on corruption, growth, and sustainability.
270
Houlder, supra note 240; Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration, THE
GROUP OF 20, http://www.g20.org/docs/g20_russia/priorities.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Houlder, supra note 250.
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some of the tax channeled through Hong Kong where there is no real business activity, given the fact that China has a huge amount of capital outflows through tax havens. Being a capital exporting country, China has legitimate reason to be concerned about tax evasion in tax havens. In this
sense, the business order created by Circular 698 is essentially part of the
global initiative the world community is in a great attempt to achieve.
An update from the OECD is scheduled for the October Finance Ministers’ meeting of the G20 and the goal is to complete the framework by
2014, after which it is scheduled to be presented at the Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in February 2014.275 An action plan
on tackling tax base erosion and profit shifting is tabled to the G20 by the
OECD. The OECD’s plan works on the most contentious issues including
tax treatment on digital businesses and transfer pricing.276
In addition to concerns over tax evasion, the G20 addressed the issues
of tax avoidance through the use of shifting profits to low tax jurisdictions.
The use of these “very low” or “double non-taxation” practices “undermine
the fairness and integrity” of the tax system.277 The leaders did not come to
a specific agreement addressing how to prevent the abuse of tax planning by
multinational enterprises. However, implementation of tax rules and punishment for violations take place at the national level. Therefore, the automatic sharing of information will provide an opportunity for individual nations to punish individuals and entities seeking to avoid their tax
obligations, but will not ensure even-handed enforcement between jurisdictions. In order to prevent companies from taking advantage of different disclosure requirements, a common template is to be created to require companies to report their global profit allocation and tax payments.
The Tax Annex to the 2013 Declaration does state that profits should
be taxed “where economic activities occur and value is created.” In essence,
this principle supports the Chinese tax authority’s reasoning in promulgating Circular 698. If the financial gain realized by the sale of a foreign company is attributable to the success of an enterprise or appreciation of an asset located in China, then China is arguably “where economic activities
occur and value is created.” China’s Circular 698 can be better understood
in the context of this evolving global tax reform.
A simple comparison shows that taxing indirect offshore disposal is
still, in a global context, a novel regulatory innovation with few countries
having introduced such rules or taxing approaches to date.278 This innova275
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Vanessa Houlder, G20 Sharpens Attack on International Corporate Tax Avoidance, FIN. TIMES
(July 14, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a2752ec6-eb23-11e2-bfdb-00144feabdc0.html.
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Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration, supra note 270.
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India is another country which has aggressively tightened its regulatory arms over cross-border
transactions. India threatened to levy a charge and bring Nokia’s total liability to about US$1.1 billion.
This may bar Nokia from transferring its Indian assets to Microsoft as part of the group’s €5.4 billion
276
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tive and far-reaching regulatory approach, however, easily becomes a hotbutton issue in cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving China elements. Difficulties can easily arise for strategic investment by multinationals. It is also unclear how Circular 698 interacts with China’s network of
tax treaties, which may complicate the availability of tax credits and relief
under both China’s tax treaties and domestic tax laws.
CONCLUSION
“Denying the existence of the offshore holding company” in Circular
698 constitutes a new regulatory tool for lifting the corporate veil. When the
ultimate foreign shareholder indirectly transfers the equity of the Chinese
resident enterprise through the transfer of equity in the offshore holding
company, the Chinese tax authority may “lift” (or “ignore”) the existence of
the offshore holding company as a separate legal person according to Circular 698 and regard the transaction as the foreign shareholder’s direct transfer of equity in the Chinese resident enterprise so that enterprise income tax
is levied on the corporate capital gain. However, it must be pointed out that
the State Administration of Taxation has no legislative power to interpret or
create new rules outside of the existing veil-piercing regime provided for in
China’s Company Law. Thus, the Chinese tax authority’s regulatory attempt in this regard is seemingly unlawful.
Meanwhile, it must be recognized that there is a rationality attached to
Circular 698 and the underlying justification lies in the tax authority’s attempt to regulate increasingly popular “round-tripping” investments, which
are adversely affecting China’s tax base. As a practical matter, while tax
planning strategies that exploit loopholes are mostly legal, these strategies
constitute a major risk to tax revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness. For
years, multinationals have routed profits through low tax regimes and used
other techniques to minimize their tax bills. Against this background, Circular 698 makes sense in the local context as well as given various Chinese
authorities’ recent regulatory moves to tighten up the regulatory space
around the “round-trip investment” model. Within this framework, Circular
698 can be viewed as a move in line with the Ramsay principle developed
from English common law, a reformation of the traditional lifting circumstance of “avoiding the legal obligations.”
With generally and vaguely termed provisions in Circular 698, the
Chinese tax authority enjoys unlimited discretion. Further, the Chinese tax
authority takes “no employee, no other assets and debts, no other investments and no other businesses” as the criteria to characterize the offshore
phone business sale. Nokia had other tax disputes with India’s revenue department concerning a US$375
million payments made by its Indian subsidiary to its parent in Finland. James Crabtree & Richard
Milne, Nokia Tax Dispute in Danger of Escalating, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013, at 14.
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holding company as a façade without any reasonable commercial purposes.
While Circular 698 may be of use to further clarify or apply the veilpiercing doctrine under Chinese law, it may be more constructive if the
Chinese tax authority, by utilizing the Ramsey principle, applies the Circular only in circumstances where (i) the foreign investors (i.e., ultimate
shareholders) planned to indirectly transfer equity of the Chinese resident
enterprise when setting up the offshore holding company and the plan will
be implemented inevitably, and (ii) the formation of the offshore holding
company has no other reasonable commercial purposes except avoiding tax
liability. In these cases, the Ramsay principle can be applied to deny the
separate legal personality status of the offshore holding company. However,
if the offshore holding company is set up after the two parties of the acquisition deal have materialized their intention to transfer equity (unless the
parties succeed in proving a reasonable commercial purpose), then the formation of the offshore holding company may justify veil piercing by the tax
authority and accordingly a tax liability can be imposed on the offshore
controlling party.
The norm of income taxation, that is, the principle of equal taxation of
all varieties of income from all sources, has been under attack in the recent
financial crisis. In advanced economies, tax revenues have lagged behind
the demands on public expenditure, which resulted in higher levels of public debt. Governments are in a transitional period of reforming not only welfare programs, but also taxation programs to meet new challenges. The increased global interconnectedness has made it more difficult for
governments to effectively govern cross-border commercial transactions
and activities. For example, the wide use of “offshore” vehicles and tax havens, while enabling investors to exploit aggressive tax planning, has increased the complexity and difficulty in governance. China suffered lost tax
revenues and a distorted financial system from capital flight, which is facilitated and encouraged by the offshore system. The existence and availability
of offshore systems made it extremely difficult for China, as well as other
countries, to tax the passive investment income of their own residents.
While the Chinese government continues to offer tax incentives to attract
foreign investment, it is also under increased pressure to fill in regulatory
loopholes so as to not only minimize the distortive effects on capital allocation through the offshore system, but also make the entire regulatory regime
effective and functioning.
The effects of tax planning of multinationals are a major source of
public concern. The efforts to reform the international tax system, especially to deal with the problems of tax havens and capital flight, have been given a new impetus in the aftermath of the latest financial crisis. These issues
have been taken up by the G8 and G20, and some multilateral initiatives to
deal with a global systemic system have also been taken up by the OECD,
the EU, G8 and G20. Nevertheless, the original plan to have a clear com-
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mon transparency standard embodied in a multilateral treaty for secrecy information exchange lost its way. As a result, the current status goes back to
individual states which are supposed to negotiate bilateral tax information
exchange agreements. Against this background, it is not surprising to see
China, among others, take some self-standing initiatives for its own interests, one of which was the adoption of Circular 698. This individual-state
approach (opposite to a system-wide perspective), however, is difficult to
administer and the lack of clear guidelines could have a negative impact on
investment decisions. There is a clear need for a more comprehensive system for global cooperation even though the existing international taxation
system leaves legitimation of taxation to each state, creating a competitive
tension between states.
China is currently facing a variety of structural challenges and shifts.
Among others, the most fundamental challenge is to have a functioning and
modern legal infrastructure. Apart from the judiciary, an effective regulatory regime, including regulatory tools, instruments, ideology and methodologies, is key for China’s long-term growth. China’s economy is far more
complicated than it was previously. It is also, so far as it draws in questions
of legislative simplicity and administrative efficacy, relevant to the concerns about complexity, instability and the rule of law. The crux of the issue
here is that any reform to the corporate tax system should represent a pattern of values and a harnessing of public law, molding the relations between
the corporate sector and the state so as to promote a specific ideological
view of the public interest. Part of the corporate tax regulatory scheme, Circular 698 could also be seen in legal terms as a form of public law due to its
extensive involvement in spheres of public life.279 Accordingly, any reform
to the corporation (tax) code needs to reflect a consensus around the imperative of economic growth, around the importance of fairness, and in the
tax regulation’s shifting nature and constant change, a series of more or less
prudential responses to the contingencies of a changing business sector.
Consequently, the tax reform should return to the rule of law, i.e., reducing
its complexity and ambiguity, keeping the rules as stable and comprehensive as possible and assessing more accurately the costs that businesses will
have to bear for compliance, all of which reflect the conventional
normativist concerns with public law280 (arguably including corporate law).
All these concerns can be and should be accommodated within a neoliberal
ideological framework with a prioritization of rule of law in corporate tax
code reform. The reform of the corporate tax code should also be driven by
commercial factors rather than by pure tax considerations.

279
280

556

MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEAS OF PUBLIC LAW 131 (2003).
Id. at 129.

